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Emerging research highlights increasing subnational activity on climate change. While most 
researchers explore mitigation of climate change, far less attention has been directed towards 
climate adaptation. In this dissertation I explore the sub-national politics surrounding climate 
adaptation in the United States through three broad questions. 1) At the state level, why do some 
states adopt adaptation plans while others do not? Are there any emerging patterns among 
predictors for policy, and do these vary across policy adoption (yes/no) and policy goals and 
ambitiousness? 2) Within urban politics, in what ways do local politics shape adaptation efforts 
given the relative risks faced by cities and the broader political context of climate decision-
making? Are there differences in factors predicting commitment across size - mainly small, 
medium and large cities? And 3) to better understand the quality of collaborative partnerships in 
adaptation planning, I ask multiple interrelated questions such as which agencies are more likely 
to collaborate with one another to develop and implement strategies for climate adaptation, and 
do we see any patterns among these partnerships? Which stakeholders are involved in building 
climate resilience, and what are the means and tools used for these collaborations? Further, what 
is the importance given to collaboration within adaptation policy documents, and at what stages 
of the policy process are these partnerships most evident? The findings from this research 
contribute to the Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) theory, collaborative governance and public 
participation, and well as environmental decision-making on climate change adaptation among 
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"This one trend, climate change, affects all trends… If we let the world keep warming as fast as 
it is and sea levels rising as fast as they are, and weather patterns keep shifting in more 
unexpected ways, then before long we are going to have to devote more and more and more of 
our economic and military resources not to growing opportunity for our people, but to adapting 
to the various consequences of a changing planet." 
- U.S. President Barack Obama (Paris Agreement Talks, Dec 2015) 
 Climate change is defined as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in 
addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods” (UNFCCC, 
1992; pp.7). Climate change will impact societies and ecosystems in myriad of ways globally 
and in the United States. Within North America, climate related changes are already visible and 
expected to continue. Increase in air and water temperatures, reduced frost days, increased 
frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, rise in sea level, and reduced snow cover are 
a few ways climate change is impacting communities and the economy (EPA, 2014). For 
example, average winter temperatures have increased by more than 70F in the Midwest and 
northern Great Plains over the past 30 years, and coastal areas have witnessed more intense 
hurricanes and related storms (Karl, Melillo, & Peterson, 2009). Hurricane Katrina and Sandy 
are examples that illustrate potential for damage to human life and property from extreme 
weather events. 
 Often termed a ‘wicked problem’, climate change is complex, spans different spatial and 
temporal scales, and involves diverse actors and institutions. Geographically, the problem ranges 
from a local city or town to the national and global scale. This wide spatial dimension is 




can have a far reaching impact on a geographic space thousands of miles away (e.g. ice sheet 
melt in Greenland, sea level rise and inundation of small island countries in the Pacific Ocean).  
Climate change is multi-dimensional, and cuts across different departments and 
bureaucracies, at all levels of government. The mitigation aspect of the problem (emissions) 
spans various sectors including energy, agriculture, land-use, transportation and construction; 
while the adaptation aspect can involve water, food, health and poverty. There are numerous 
stakeholders involved with industry, public and private sector, civil society actors, and the 
citizenry spread across geographically within and beyond national borders. The issue also 
includes an inter-generational component that aims to incorporate future generations into the 
scope of the problem (Adger et al., 2005). Different actors have large economic and survival 
factors at stake, and the risks, resources and incentives are unevenly distributed.  
  As an issue, climate change also involves complex scientific and technical information. 
There are large risks and uncertainties, and these are spread over long timeframes, spanning 
beyond a decade to the next 50 to 100 years. These features of climate change pose a challenge 
to the governance of the problem. The complexity of scale, actors, and scope make it difficult to 
reach consensus on how responsibility and resources for the problem can be allocated, 
coordinated and enforced. 
 Impacts of climate change elicit action on mitigation (by reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions) to minimize harm to the climate, as well as developing adaptation strategies1 to adjust 
to the inevitable impacts of climate change on individuals, communities, businesses and 
countries. The U.S. Global Change Research Program has been preparing National Climate 
                                                      
 
1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) describes adaptation as “Practical steps to protect countries 





Assessments since the late 1990s. These reports are submitted to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as part of a national commitment to the framework. 
However, these national assessments have not translated into cohesive federal policy with 
financial commitments for both mitigation and adaptation measures (USGCRP, 2013). It was not 
until 2009, under President Obama’s administration, an Interagency Climate Adaptation Task 
Force was created to assess impacts and recommend programs and policies for the nation. 
Within this federal policy void, much as the historical pattern with emergence of environmental 
policy in the U.S., state and local governments have taken a lead for the mitigation and 
adaptation to climate change (Rabe, 2004). 
 To understand the challenges and solutions to climate change, scholarship on the subject 
has emerged within an interdisciplinary background.  This new critical field comprises climate 
scientists, ecologists, environmental lawyers, NGOs, and other experts, but the presence of 
political scientists is almost missing (Javeline, 2014). While some studies have emerged on 
climate mitigation (Laukkonen et al., 2009; Lutsey & Sperling, 2008; Peterson & Rose, 2006; 
Pollak, Meyer, & Wilson, 2011; Vivian & Vicki, 2011; Wheeler, 2008; Zimmerman & Faris, 
2011), the sparseness in research is more apparent for adaptation to climate change.  
 Research Agenda: There is urgency to fill this gap in literature given that almost all 
technical advances in adaptation are dependent on political factors for their adoption, 
implementation and effectiveness (Javeline, 2014). Scholars suggest that the politics surrounding 
adaptation will be different from mitigation as it does not present the same collective action 
problems (Niles & Lubell, 2012). For example, resilience initiatives undertaken by a 
government, such as improvement in water supply and storage infrastructure, will benefit its 




mitigation measures to reduce emissions within the same jurisdiction would not necessarily 
result in benefits of reduced climate change impacts, if other governments and individuals do not 
undertake similar measures (free-rider problem).  
 This demands a separate investigation of climate adaptation. Political science subfields 
such as political economy (costs of adaptation), political theory (justice), urban politics, public 
opinion and federalism are some key areas of critical thinking that have the potential to broaden 
our understanding of climate change adaptation in the United States.  
 Preliminary adaptation studies in the U.S. have mainly been case study research or have 
qualitatively analyzed the content of state and local climate action plans (Baker, Peterson, 
Brown, & McAlpine, 2012; Preston, Westaway, & Yuen, 2011; Tang, Brody, Quinn, Chang, & 
Wei, 2010; Wang, 2013; Zahran, Brody, Vedlitz, Grover, & Miller, 2008). These findings are 
valuable and have contributed to the initial understanding of adaptation planning. However, 
being limited in their scope, the findings are not generalizable and many questions remain 
unanswered. The scholarship still lacks a thorough understanding of the real politics surrounding 
climate adaptation.  
 This dissertation examines policies at the sub-national level that increase resilience and 
adapt to climate change. I aim to identify important trends and contribute to new knowledge to 
the study of climate adaptation in the United States.  Many questions need to be asked within this 
broader research program; however, this work will focus on three areas:  
 Chapter 1: Politics of Adaptation: Vulnerability, Diffusion & State Adaptation 
Policy: Since the year 2008, many state governments have developed their own stand-alone State 
Adaptation Plans (SAPs). With no federal standard approaches to climate adaptation planning, 




mechanisms applied. To date 14 state governments have adopted plans, while 9 more are in-
process. Given this growth in adaptation plans, I ask the question, why do some state 
governments adopt climate adaptation policies while others do not? What factors predict the 
emergence of policies and are there any patterns for policy adoption and the number of goals and 
strategies set by different states? 
Chapter 2: When Size Matters: Predictors of Adaptation Planning in Small, 
Medium and Large U.S. Cities: Even with federal and state government action, the role of 
cities will remain pertinent to developing policy solutions for climate change. Local governments 
have jurisdiction over various adaptation policy sectors such as transportation, drinking water, 
land use and infrastructure which are more likely to be tailored to the local climate impacts. 
Currently there are only 22 local governments2 that have their own adaptation plan. Interestingly, 
1173 local governments have signed the Compact of Mayors agreement, and 174 mayors have 
signed the Resilient Communities for America Agreement (RC4A), committing to concrete 
adaptation planning.  
These developments demand a better understanding of factors that lead to city action for 
climate preparedness. I ask, in what ways do local politics shape adaptation efforts given the 
relative risks faced by cities and the broader political context of climate decision-making? Why 
are some cities more likely to commit to or engage in climate adaptation planning than others? I 
also delve deeper and investigate differences in factors predicting adaptation commitment across 
city size - mainly small, medium and large cities.  
                                                      
 
2 These number is excluding County-level government adaptation plans and action 




Chapter 3: Unpacking the Collaboration “Black-Box” – A Framework to Analyze 
State Adaptation Plans: The impacts of climate change are heterogeneous and cut across 
typical political and economic boundaries. Successful adaptation to adverse impacts stemming 
from climate change will thus require a high level of collaboration between multiple levels of 
governments and a range of stakeholders. Planning documents are indicative of the commitment 
of action by government authorities.  To better understand the quality of collaborative 
partnerships in adaptation planning, I develop an adaptation plan analysis framework that asks 
multiple inter-related questions – Which agencies are more likely to collaborate with one another 
to develop and implement strategies for climate adaptation, and do we see any patterns among 
these partnerships? Which stakeholders are involved in building climate resilience, and what are 
the means and tools used for these collaborations? Further, what is the importance given to 
collaboration within adaptation policy documents, and at what stages of the policy process are 
these partnerships most evident?  
 For each of these three main chapters, I provide the relevant research, the theoretical 
background, discuss the hypothesis to be tested, the research design, share the data and methods, 





POLITICS OF ADAPTATION: VULNERABILITY, DIFFUSION & STATE 
ADAPTATION POLICY 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Human induced climate change is occurring, and the consequences stemming from 
climate change will be wide-ranging and significant.  Climate related natural disasters are 
expected to increase in both frequency and intensity.  Hurricane Katrina and Sandy illustrate the 
high potential for damage to human life and property from extreme weather events.  Changes in 
air and water temperatures, reduced frost days, reduced snow cover and sea level rise are some of 
the ways climate change is impacting American communities and the economy (CEQ, 2011; 
EPA, 2014; IPCC, 2014; Karl et al., 2009). 
Action to address climate change can focus on mitigation strategies to reduce GHG 
emissions, and on adaptation strategies to buffer communities from the inevitable impacts of 
climate change. Despite growing scientific evidence, there is little consensus on how to address 
climate change in the United States. Federal action on mitigation and adaption policy has been 
limited.  While, national climate assessments have been prepared since the 1990s, these reports 
have not resulted in any cohesive federal policy (Smith et al., 2010; USGCRP, 2013). 
Interestingly, many state and local governments across the United States are developing a range 
of climate mitigation and adaptation plans to address climate change (Glicksman, 2010; Rabe, 




A range of scholars have examined the development of subnational climate policy in the 
U.S. (Carley & Miller, 2012; Huang et al., 2011; Krause, 2012; Peterson & Rose, 2006; Pollak et 
al., 2011; Sharp et al., 2011; Stoutenborough & Beverlin, 2008; Wheeler, 2008; Zimmerman & 
Faris, 2011).  This work sheds light on why state and local governments adopt and implement 
climate mitigation policies (Betsill, 2001; Jones & Levy, 2007; Laukkonen et al., 2009; Lutsey & 
Sperling, 2008; Rabe, 2004, 2008, 2010; Sharp et al., 2011; Zahran et al., 2008).  Climate 
adaptation, in comparison, is relatively unexamined.   
Adaptation measures are defined as steps taken by governments and communities to 
address the likely disruption and damage from effects of climate change (IPCC-TAR, 2001; 
pp.4). There is clear evidence that even if governments take action to reduce emissions, 
communities will still experience a range of climate related events, and many of these will have 
negative consequences for economies and human life (IPCC, 2014; USGCRP, 2013). Therefore, 
exploring adaptation policy is critical. Measures for adaptation will require significant changes 
across many sectors such as agriculture, water, public health, and conservation. And each of 
these plans and strategies requires the commitment and investment of policymakers. Despite 
politics and governments playing a key role in successful adaptation, currently there is very little 
political science research that focuses on climate adaptation (Javeline, 2014). 
 This chapter examines the factors that predict the emergence of State Adaptation Plans 
(SAPs). I ask the question - why are some states adopting adaptation policies while others are 
not? What factors predict emergence of these state level policies? The study applies the 
Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) theory to better understand why some state governments formerly 
engage in climate adaption planning, and others do not (Berry & Berry 1994, 2007). I consider 




state fiscal capacity and interest group pressures along with testing the impact of external 
pressure driving the development and level of commitment to climate adaption.  Applying a 
panel data analysis from 2009 to 2015, I test this theory using two dependent variables. The first 
is a basic measure of policy adoption, noting if a state has adopted its State Adaptation Plan 
(SAP) or not. The second dependent variable captures the intensity of a state’s commitment to 
climate adaption by measuring the number of goals articulated in these plans. I find that both 
internal determinants and external pressure matter. First, increased geographic and human 
vulnerabilities and prevailing ideology of the mass public influence a state’s decision to create 
formal adaptation plans. States along coastal regions and with liberal citizens are more likely to 
adopt SAPs, and are also more ambitious in their goals for these plans.  Second, interest group 
pressure from the carbon intensive industry significantly reduces the likelihood of a state taking 
adaptation measures. States with higher contribution of the carbon industry to their GDP are 
more likely not to adopt SAPs or choose more conservative goal targets and possibly resemble 
symbolic policies.  
However, I also find some difference among factors that predict policy adoption and 
policy ambition. My results suggest that while community vulnerabilities and poverty levels 
motivate states to adopt, these are not significant predictors to influence higher number of policy 
goals. Further, pressures from environmental groups are not influential in actual policy adoption, 
but this pressure seems to propel states to set higher number of strategies in their plans. Finally, 
EPA regions are important conduits for diffusion. It may be that regional staff serve as an 
information resource and encourage state decision makers to embark on adaptation planning.   
These finding advance our understanding of which factors tend to influence policymakers 




for policy action related to climate adaptation.  It also contributes to DOI theory by testing 
dependent variables that go beyond the dichotomous ‘yes/no’ variables, by capturing more 
descriptive variables like the intensity of policy commitment. The results show interesting trends 
in climate adaptation politics. This paper proceeds as follows: first I provide a background to 
climate adaptation policy in the Unites States and outline the theoretical framework.  Next, I 
describe my methods and data and then present my results and discussion. I conclude the paper 
with avenues for future research. 
1.2. CLIMATE ADAPTATION POLICY 
Climate adaptation and mitigation strategies are both required for effective climate 
policy. Mitigation alone is insufficient as substantial impacts from climate change are already 
unavoidable with the current levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the atmosphere. An 
adaptation only policy is also inadequate as the costs to adapt become less effective with greater 
magnitudes of impacts (McMullen & Jabbour, 2009). A holistic climate policy thus needs a two-
pronged approach with both adaptation and mitigation action. Within the United States, the 
emergence of climate policy has been much slower in comparison to the rest of the world, and 
mitigation policy has preceded adaptation by almost a decade (Moser, 2009). While the first 
wave of state climate mitigation plans emerged in early 20004 (with the exception of Illinois’s 
1994 policy), adaptation policies do not appear till the year 2008. 
                                                      
 
4 Illinois completed its initial CAP in 1994, followed by Delaware (2000), Missouri and Rhode Island (2002), 




 Analysis of first generation climate action plans (CAPs) show that most states set goals 
for emissions-reduction, propose ways to green public sector operations5, but were lacking in 
their consideration for adaptation measures (Pollak et al., 2011; Wheeler, 2008). These 
mitigation measures are expected to emerge when there is increased deaths and injuries by 
extreme weather events, presence of citizens with more democratic views, interest group 
pressures such as number of environmental organizations (Zahran et al., 2008; Huang et al., 
2011; Peterson & Rose, 2006; Pollak et al., 2011; Zimmerman & Faris, 2011), as well as 
characteristic of the institutional structure (Krause, 2011, 2013; Sharp et al., 2011). There is also 
evidence of the carbon-intensive industry playing a role in reduced support for climate mitigation 
(Krause, 2013; Zahran et al., 2008) 
 These initial findings broaden our understanding of mitigation policies. However, climate 
adaptation is fundamentally different from mitigation. Private benefits are greater from 
adaptation measures and may increase its likelihood of adoption in comparison to mitigation 
action (Easterling et al., 2004; Niles & Lubell, 2012). This difference requires a separate 
investigation into adaption policy to understand factors surrounding politics of climate 
adaptation. 
To date, 14 states have State Adaptation Plans (SAPs) and 9 other states are in the 
process of finalizing plans (C2ES 2012; Georgetown Climate Center 2015) (See Figure 1.1 with 
map of overview of State Adaptation Plans). Strategies within these SAPs broadly fall within 9 
sectors identified by the EPA – mainly Agriculture, Biodiversity, Coasts/Oceans, Forestry, 
Emergency Preparedness, Public Health, Infrastructure, Water and a miscellaneous group of 
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‘Other’. These plans elaborate action within each sector – for example, the infrastructure sector 
for Massachusetts includes measures for energy, transportation, dam safety and flood control, 
solid & hazardous waste, built infrastructure and telecommunications. The strategies are devised 
based on current and anticipated climate impacts. 
 
Source: Institute for Policy & Social Research, The University of Kansas; Data from Georgetown Climate Center. 
The map provides an overview of the number of goals set by states in their State Adaptation Plans (SAPs). States 
with plans =14; In-progress=8; No plan=28 
Figure 1.1: Overview of State Adaptation Plans 
 A good example is New York’s SAP which identifies climate impacts in each sector and 
links goals with preparing for these impacts. The plan also estimates costs, timeframe for impacts 
and action, co-benefits and environmental justice considerations with the goals (Georgetown 
Climate Center, 2015). Further, many states have also created sector specific plans that have 
often emerged even in the absence of an overarching state policy. The state of Arizona is an 




Given adaptation activities are relatively new in the United States, peer-reviewed 
literature is still limited (Bierbaum et al., 2013). Existing adaptation studies have qualitatively 
analyzed the content of state and local climate action plans (Baker et al., 2012; Preston et al., 
2011; Tang et al., 2010; Wang, 2013). These studies find that the climate-specific action by 
states focus mainly on planning, with limited goals for capacity building and evaluation 
(Bierbaum et al., 2013; Preston et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2009). Common strategies include 
research and education, and integration of measures into existing planning and policies 
(Bierbaum et al., 2013; Füssel, 2007, 2008; Hamin, 2012; Hamin & Gurran, 2012).  
  While these findings discuss the quality of existing plans and strategies, there is a need 
for deeper investigation. There is limited understanding of why state plans vary with regard to 
their quality and ambitiousness, and furthermore why some states are more likely to adopt 
policies than other. Do patterns emerge and what predicts state adaptation policy adoption? 
Building on previous work, my paper explores these questions by testing the influence of various 
state socio-economic and political factors, as well as problem severity on the likelihood of policy 
adoption. I investigate key factors that are influential in mitigation studies to test if predictors for 
adaptation follow similar trends. 
1.3. DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION THEORY 
DOI theory explains why some governments adopt new policies while others do not (Berry, 
1994; Berry & Berry, 2007; Shipan & Volden, 2012).  The theory identifies two broad 
explanations for policy making: internal determinants and external pressure (Berry, 1994; F. S. 
Berry & Berry, 1990, 2007; Mintrom & Vergari, 1998).  Internal determinants suggest that 




include things like fiscal resources, the nature or severity of a problem within the jurisdiction, 
and citizen demand.  By contrast, external pressure or diffusion focuses on factors external to a 
government that may sway its policy making.  Diffusion mechanisms can include learning from 
neighboring jurisdictions or leaders in the field, or developing policies to compete with nearby 
governments.   
Internal Determinants 
The internal determinants model contends that state policymakers respond to internal 
characteristics of their state when adopting a new program or policy. Previous research suggests 
that political, social, and economic characteristics are motivators, obstacles or resources to 
overcome obstacles for states (Hays & Glick, 1997; Mooney & Lee, 1995; Walker, 1969). For 
example, the severity of the problem is an important motivator for states to emphasize the need 
for policy. State policy makers respond to environmental problems by mitigating concerns 
through policy adoption (Feiock & West, 1993; Lester et al., 1983; Ringquist, 1994). Scientific 
evidence indicates that climate change will have various impacts on states, including damage to 
human live, property and ecosystems. If states are initiating measures to reduce climate impacts, 
they are more likely to adopt SAPs.  
 
Hypothesis 1: States with more severe climate impact problems will be more likely to adopt 
SAPs.  Moreover, states facing more severe problems stemming from climate change will be 
more likely to articulate a broader range of goals within their SAP. 
 
Citizen ideology and institutional structure of states matter. Policymakers are receptive to 




elected officials is to win reelection, they initiate action to respond to the mass opinion within 
their state (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1985). Prior research indicated that more liberal citizens 
support more climate policy action (Hamilton, 2011) and policy makers are influenced by the 
opinion of citizens on climate change (Brulle et al., 2012).  Taken together, this suggests that 
when states have more liberal residents, the likelihood of action on climate adaption should 
increase.   
 
Hypothesis 2a: States with more liberal citizens are more likely to adopt SAPs, and articulate 
more goals, than states that have more conservative populations.  
 
With regard to institutional structure, democratic government institutions are more 
supportive of action for social welfare policies, including environmental protection (Berry et al., 
1998; Ringquist, 1994). Liberals are more willing to support government solutions for 
environmental problems, and this pattern is also expected to hold for climate adaptation.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: States that have more Democratic government institutions are more likely to 
adopt SAPs than states where Republicans control one or more branches of government. 
 
Fiscal health of a state often has positive impacts on propensity to adopt new policies (Allard, 
2004; Lowry, 2005). Policy action entails costs, and states with more resources and wealth are in 
a better position to development and implement policy measures (Daley & Garand, 2005; Dye, 
1965; Gray, 1973). A key challenge for climate adaptation policies is the cost of adaptation 




This relative cost is often identified as a barrier to adaptation policies. States with more 
economic capacity are in a relatively stronger position to act on adaptation both in terms of 
policy adoption and policy ambition. 
 
Hypothesis 3: States with higher economic resources and capacity are more likely to adopt 
SAPs.  Moreover, state wealth is expected to be positively correlated with the level of intensity of 
an SAP.  
 
Policymakers also respond to interest group pressure. Previous studies show that organized 
interests do influence policy adoption, but often a modest effect in comparison to other variables 
(Davis & Feiock, 1992; Erikson et al., 1993; Teske, 2004; Williams & Matheny, 1984). Interest 
group pressure on climate adaption can be both supportive and oppositional.  Oppositional 
pressure is likely to emerge from carbon intensive industries who may be threatened by any 
action on climate change (Krause, 2011; Zahran et al., 2008). On the other hand, supportive 
pressure is likely to emerge from environmental groups and other stakeholders who are invested 
in institutionalizing positive change.  
 
Hypothesis 4a: Greater presence of carbon intensive industry in a state will reduce the 
likelihood of states adopting SAPs, and reduce the corresponding intensity of ambitiousness. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: States with larger environmental communities will be more likely to adopt 





When policymakers gain experience on implementing a plan on a similar issue, it is easier for 
them to adopt more measures in the area. Through previous experience they tend to form 
networks, identify who their allies and opponents are, and generate policy knowledge on the 
substantive issue (Berry & Berry 2007). Such experiences are likely to reduce the intensity of 
initial hurdles for policy adoption on similar issues (climate adaptation). Given the need to 
understand climate science and its impacts to adequately address climate risks, previous 
experience in climate mitigation policies in a state would potentially create a more mature 
platform for policy action on adaptation.  
 
Hypothesis 5: States with mitigation policies are more likely to adopt climate adaptation 
plans and set more ambitious goals.  
 
State action on climate adaptation is unlikely to be driven by a singular force. Therefore, I 
also examine the conditional effects of the factors outlined by the DOI theory. Specifically, when 
severity of the problem is high, state governments, even those relatively more conservative, may 
take remedial action and adopt climate strategies. On the same lines, relatively more liberal state 
governments may tend to adopt adaptation policies faster and incorporate more intensive 
strategies in the plans. I test this hypothesis through a conditional effects model. 
 
Hypothesis 6: The conditional effect of problem severity with government ideology will likely 






Models of state policymaking need to capture both internal characteristics of the state as well 
as influence of external forces to explain policy output (Berry, 1994; Berry & Berry, 2007). 
There are two primary explanations of why policies diffuse from one state to another. First, 
states look to their ideological or geographic neighbors (Grossback, 2004) to test the successes 
and failures of new policies and borrow innovations perceived as successful (social learning 
model) (Mooney & Lee 1995; Walker 1969).  Second, states compete with each other and 
emulate policies of other states in order to achieve an economic advantage or avoid being 
disadvantaged (economic competition) (Berry & Berry, 2007).  
Diffusion of policy ideas across governments can occur from the federal government to state 
and local governments (vertical diffusion) and from one state government to another 
(horizontally) (Mohr, 1969; Walker, 1969). While observing actions of others, policymakers 
want to maintain positive policy outcomes, such as increased industry investment or improved 
environmental conditions, while avoiding or reducing the negative spillovers or externalities. 
This is often described in state politics as “race to the bottom” or a “race to the top” (Berry et al., 
2003; Prakash & Potoski, 2006; Rabe, 2010; Woods, 2006).  
The DOI theory suggests a positive influence of external pressure. States look to their 
neighbors and are more likely to adopt policies when other government units have already 
enacted the same (Berry & Berry, 1990; Glick & Hays, 1991). Given that climate policy action is 
still at a nascent stage in the United States, states will look to others for innovative programs and 
policy benefits. It is also expected that they will to be open to sharing knowledge and resources 





 Hypothesis 7: State policymakers are more likely to adopt SAPs if nearby states have also 
adopted adaptation policy (Horizontal/Regional Diffusion). And as experience is shared among 
neighboring states, they are more likely to prepare ambitious policies.  
 
Diffusion can also occur vertically from the federal government to states and local 
agencies. Vertical diffusion is usually conceptualized as funding and regulatory pressure from 
the federal government to create positive incentives or pressures directed to make states behave 
in a certain manner (Shipan & Volden, 2006). My paper will only focus on regional or horizontal 
diffusion given that there is almost a complete absence of adaptation formal policy at the 
national level for an adequate measure of federal influences.  
1.4. MODELING CLIMATE ADAPTATION POLICY 
 Studies testing DOI theory have predominantly focused on models that use dichotomous 
dependent variables for the probability of a state adopting a policy (Berry & Berry, 2007). There 
is recognition of moving away from the dichotomous dependent variables [DV] to better 
measures, like indexes, that capture the complexities of the real world (Boehmke, 2009). These 
measures transition from a “superficial” to “deep” analysis of policy adoption (Glick & Hays, 
1991, pp.836). I test two models of policymaking. My first measure is dichotomous, simply 
noting if a state has developed an SAP (‘yes/no’). Currently there are 14 states with finallized 
SAPs.  
Another way to measure the dependent variable is the level of commitment, where more 
goals and strategies set by a state can be indicative of more commitment for adaptation planning. 




planning and capacity building strategies. States with larger number of goals, like Massachusetts 
and California (at 373 and 345 goals respectively), go beyond to include goals for post-
implementation and monitoring (Georgetown Climate Center, 2015).  
My second dependent variable is the intensity or ambition within these plans, and is 
measured by the number of goals within an SAP. Investigating ambitiousness distinguishes state 
policies that are largely symbolic from others involving extensive commitment of resources 
through detailed planning and enforcement action (Downs & Mohr, 1976). It can be argued that 
states with more goals have given deeper consideration to ways to build resilience, and by 
incorporating them into state goals, are more likely to move beyond planning to actual 
implementation.   
 I primarily rely on policy data from Georgetown Climate Center’s Adaptation 
Clearinghouse. The center collects information on adaptation policies across all levels of 
government – federal, state and local; and categorizes strategies within the nine sector 
classification used by EPA.6 Detailed coding processes outlines basic features of SAPs such as 
the total number of goals set by a state, the grouping of goals into the nine sectors, as well as 
whether the state goals aim to create law and policy, build capacities, and post-implementation 
monitoring. Information is also provided on the state’s progress on goals such as whether the 
goals are completed, currently in progress, or have not been acted on. My dependent variables 
are created using this information for all 50 states. 
                                                      
 
6 Environment Protection Agency (EPA) uses a nine sector classification – Agriculture, Forestry, Biodiversity, 




Table 1.1: State Adaptation Policy Overview 
No. State Adaptation Plans 











1 Alaska Yes 2010 158 1 52 7 
2 Alabama No      
3 Arkansas No      
4 Arizona No      
5 California Yes 2009 345 48 251 7 
6 Colorado Yes 2011 72 7 34 4 
7 Connecticut Yes 2013 76 2 47 8 
8 Delaware In Progress      
9 Florida Yes 2008 28 0 16 6 
10 Georgia No      
11 Hawaii In Progress      
12 Iowa No      
13 Idaho No      
14 Illinois No      
15 Indiana No      
16 Kansas No      
17 Kentucky No      
18 Louisiana No      
19 Massachusetts Yes 2011 373 24 191 8 
20 Maryland Yes 2008 154 3 91 8 
21 Maine Yes 2010 118 4 84 8 
22 Michigan In Progress      
23 Minnesota In Progress      
24 Missouri No      
25 Mississippi No      
26 Montana No      
27 North Carolina No      
28 North Dakota No      
29 Nebraska No      
30 New Hampshire Yes 2009 33 2 17 6 
31 New Jersey In Progress      
32 New Mexico No      
33 Nevada No      
34 New York Yes 2010 121 17 63 7 
35 Ohio No      
36 Oklahoma No      




No. State Adaptation Plans 











38 Pennsylvania Yes 2011 87 2 33 6 
39 Rhode Island In Progress      
40 South Carolina No      
41 South Dakota No      
42 Tennessee No     0 
43 Texas No     0 
44 Utah No     0 
45 Virginia Yes 2008 43 2 5 3 
46 Vermont In Progress     0 
47 Washington Yes 2012 287 12 165 7 
48 Wisconsin In Progress     0 
49 West Virginia No     0 
50 Wyoming No     0 
*Total 9 EPA Sectors  
Source: Georgetown Climate Center – State and Local Adaptation Plans 
States with Plans = 14; States Plans In-Progress = 8; States without Plans = 28. Total = 50. 
The first adaptation policy was adopted in 2008 and states have continued to prepare policies 
till date. My study is a panel data analysis from 2008 to 2014, and I use 2008 as the base year for 
my analysis. I develop and test parsimonious models of both policy adoption and policy 
ambition. Since conditions from a previous year are likely to result in the next year’s outcome, I 
lag my independent variables by one year (2007).  
Independent Variables 
Several different independent variables are used in this analysis to test the relative effects of 
internal determinants and external pressures on state decision making. Table 1.2 provides an 




Table 1.2: Model Variable Description 




Dichotomous variable – states with 
plans coded as 1, states with no 
plans or in-progress coded 0 (2008).  
 




Count variable - total number of 
goals set forth in a state adaptation 
plan (SAP) 




Problem severity Per Capita total number of deaths 
from environmental disasters by 
state 
+ National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) 
(2007 – 2013) 
Vulnerability A. Total percentage of population in 
poverty in a state 
+ American Community 
Survey (2007 – 2013) 
 B. Length of coastline (miles) of a 
state 
 
+ Statistical Abstract of 
United States (2012) 
Political factors Citizen Ideology: Average 
ideological positioning of active 
electorate on a liberal to 
conservative continuum 
 
- Berry, Ringquist, Fording, 
and Hansen 1998 
 (2007 – 2013) 
 Government Ideology: Ideology of 
state’s elected officials across 
legislature, senate, and governors on 
a liberal to conservative continuum 
 
- Berry, Ringquist, Fording, 





Environmental Groups: Per capita 
number of registered Sierra Club 
members in a State  
 
+ The Sierra Club United 
States 
(2007-2013) 
 Industry Group: Percent of carbon 
intensive industry contribution to 
total state GDP from 4 main sectors 
- Mining, Utilities, Construction, 
and Manufacturing 
 
- Bureau of Economic, U.S. 
Department of Commerce 
(2007-2013) 
State Resources Fiscal capacity - Median household 
income of citizens in a state 
 
+ U.S. Census Bureau  
 (2007-2013) 
Civic Engagement Percent of state urban population + U.S. Census Bureau (2010) 
 




Variables Name Variable Operation Sign Data Source 







Percent of number of states within 
an EPA region group that have 
adaptation plans. Total of 10 EPA 
regions.  
+ U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency – 
Regional Offices  
*Sign – Direction of influence 
Problem severity: Climate change is expected to have many impacts such as the increase 
in frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, lead to large temperature fluctuations, and 
sea level rise (IPCC, 2015). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), is 
one of the leading organizations in the nation that monitors and measures these weather related 
changes. This includes information on number of severe weather incidents, their economic 
impacts on crops and property, and the number of direct and indirect injuries and deaths resulting 
for the events. In the interest of keeping my models parsimonious, I select the most appropriate 
indicator – human loss.7 I measure the intensity of problem of climate change through the 
impacts of environmental disasters on number of deaths in a state. Previous studies have used 
number of fatalities and injuries to reflect greater threat from environmental disasters (Battersby 
et al., 2011; Borden & Cutter, 2008; Born & Klimaszewski‐Blettner, 2013; Boruff et al., 2005; 
Zahran et al., 2008). 
Vulnerability: I capture both human and geographic vulnerabilities of states in my 
models. While a specific region may face similar climate events, the impacts on community are 
highly dependent on their coping capacity to withstand the risks. Climate adaptation discourses 
                                                      
 
7 I refrained from aggregating number of disasters across counties as there is large variation in the geographic size 
and number of counties within states. A mere average would not provide the true picture for state comparison. Total 




point to economic capacity being a key factor in determining the potential for communities to 
withstand climate risks (IPCC 2014). I use the percentage of population in poverty in a state as a 
measure of community vulnerabilities. Previous studies have also shown that coastal regions are 
relatively more vulnerable to impacts of severe storms and sea level rise (IPCC 2014, Zahran et 
al., 2008). I use the measure of the total coastline of a state from the Statistical Abstracts as a 
proxy for higher geographic vulnerabilities.  
Citizen Ideology and Institutional Structure: The indicator for citizen ideology measures 
the average ideology of the active electorate (on the same continuum from liberals to 
conservatives). Citizen opinions are captured on various salient policies and vote preferences to 
create a citizen score for each state (See Berry et al. 1998 and 2010 for more detail). The citizen 
ideology score thus represents the average ideological preference of the mass public.  
Berry et al. 1998 (updated 2010, and 2015) provide widely used indicators for both 
citizen ideology and state government ideology. Institutional ideology is created through a 
combination of measures that represent the “center of gravity” of the state’s elected officials on a 
continuum from liberals to conservatives (pp.3).8  This measure reflects both chambers of a state 
legislature along with ideology of the governor.  I use this measure to represent government 
ideology across the key institutions that play an important role in passing state policies and laws.  
Interest group influence: To capture environmental interest group pressure I utilize the 
record of Sierra Club Memberships in a state.  This data is only available on request from the 
organization’s national office. I calculate the per capita Sierra membership for each state as an 
                                                      
 
8 Berry et al. 1998 – State Institutional Ideology calculated from the weighted average of the ideological position of 
each of five institutional actors - (i) the Democratic delegation in the state house, (ii) the Republican delegation in 
the state house, (iii) the Democratic delegation in the state senate, (iv) the Republican delegation in the state senate, 





indicator for pro-environmental and climate action pressure on policymakers. While I expect 
environmental groups to support climate adaption policies and lobby for more ambitious 
policies, climate change, and climate adaption in particular, is also likely to motivate 
oppositional interest groups. 
Scientific evidence shows that climate change is caused by the release of GHG emissions, 
especially carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. These emissions are released primarily through 
the burning of fossil fuel. Climate policies require fossil fuel or carbon-based industries to reduce 
their emissions by either using less fuel or switching to cleaner sources of energy (IPCC, 2007, 
2014). These changes will eventually come at a cost to industries, leading to likely opposition for 
all climate related policies - mitigation and adaptation (Brulle, 2014; Dunlap & Jacques, 2013; 
Dunlap & McCright, 2011; Jacques et al., 2008; Oreskes & Conway, 2010).  
I capture this opposing pressure through the presence of carbon intensive industries in a 
state. I aggregate the GDP from the mining, utilities, construction and manufacturing sector and 
calculate the percent of carbon intensive industry contribution for each state. These two variables 
are commonly used to capture the relative strength of industry versus environmental interest 
among states (Ringquist 1993; Miller, 2002; Pollak et al., 2011). 
 State Capacity: The capacity of a state’s economy can be measured by several variables, 
including per capita income, gross domestic product (GDP), and level of urbanization (William 
et al., 1987; Daley & Garand, 2005; Walker, 1969). Here I consider a state’s economic 
conditions and civic engagement. States with higher levels of economic development have 
greater probability of adopting policies, and greater personal income by state’s citizens leads 
them to demand better government services. I include a measure of median household income 





Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
    Policy Adoption 0.20 0.400 0 1 
Policy Ambition 28.06 74.137 0 373 
     Independent Variable 
    Deaths from disasters 0.00000283 0.00000770 0 0.0001792 
Poverty rate 23.97 3.00 17.60 31.40 
Coastline length 863.70 3945.76 0 28162.26 
Citizen ideology 51.44 15.81 8.44 95.97 
Government ideology  48.95 25.54 0 92.45 
Sierra Club membership 0.0019 0.00103 0.00043 0.00644 
Carbon industry presence 22.31 7.05 9.02 53.03 
Median household income 54599.94 8409.897 37173 78632 
Urbanization rate  72.40 14.67 38.12 94.95 
Mitigation policy adoption 0.394 0.489 0 1 
EPA regional adoption 0.16 0.24 0 1 
 Policy Experience: The Center for Climate & Energy Solutions (C2ES) provides a 
database for state’s experiences in various policies, among others, on reducing GHG emissions. 
While there are a range of actions currently undertaken, I focus on the most similar measure to 
climate adaption plans by examining whether states have implemented State Action Plan on 
mitigation. I create a dichotomous variable for whether such policies are in existence as a 
measure for previous experience on climate policies. 
Horizontal Diffusion: In the absence of federal adaptation policies, my paper focuses on 
horizontal effects or external pressures from a state’s neighbors. In the context of environmental 




offices.9 These offices provide a platform to share information and pool resources for 
environmental protection, including action for climate change. It is expected that states within 
regional groups will influence each other on policy decisions. For each state, I measure the 
strength of external pressure through a moving average that calculates the percentage of states 
within an EPA region adopting policy (excluding the current state). This reflects the strength of 
group action or inaction pressure on an individual states policy choice.  
 After merging the data, I test two separate models of policy making. First, I use logistic 
regression to predict the likelihood of a state adopting an adaption plan or SAP. My second 
model predicts the intensity or ambition of the SAP. For this model, my dependent variable is 
count data. Therefore, I rely upon negative binomial regression to test the relative influence of 
internal factors and external pressure on the intensity of an SAP. The negative binomial is 
preferred for count data (here the count of goals in SAPs), especially with over-dispersed data.10 
I also include a conditional effect in my models. I test the influence of the severity of the 
problem on government ideology to examine if policymakers are more likely to respond to the 
problem, even in conservative institutional settings. I run both models with the same set of 
independent variables, and separately for all direct predictors and those with conditional effects 
to test influences on adoption and ambition among states.  
1.5. RESULTS 
 The descriptive statistics of our variables and results of our models are presented in Table 
1.3 and Table 1.4 respectively. In keeping with past research on DOI theory, both internal 
                                                      
 
9 EPA has 10 Regional Offices. For more detail on grouping visit www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/visiting-regional-office 
10 The Standard Deviation of our variable is greater than the Mean. In such situations, the Negative Binomial 




determinants and external pressures are significant predictors of state policymaking. I discuss the 
findings in the context of what factors matter for states to adopt climate adaptation policies 
(policy adoption), and what factors influence the level of intensity within an SAP (policy 
ambitiousness). 
With growing impacts of climate change, the severity of the problem and communities 
vulnerabilities to these impacts is expected to have bearing on policy choices. I find that 
proximity to coastal areas significantly matters for states in adopt policies and setting higher 
number of goals. Interesting, the level of poverty within a state is significant for policymakers 
adopting a policy, but does not influence the goals or its ambitiousness. States are more likely to 
respond to human vulnerabilities in considering an action plan, but once the plan is adopted, the 
level of poverty is unlikely to influence the goals set.  
While vulnerability is a significant predictor for adoption, as expected, the economic 
capacity of states also plays a role. States with higher median incomes are significantly more 
likely to innovate and adopt SAPs.  State wealth, however, is modestly significant for policy 
adoption. This partially fits previous findings that identify the need for resources to overcome 
obstacles that states face while innovating or implementing new policies. When states have good 
fiscal health, they are able to finance public services that boost the state’s propensity to innovate 
(Daley & Garand, 2005). I find that once a state adopts an SAP, its economic capacity 
significantly influences the ambitiousness of the strategies adopted. This could imply that 
economic capacity is an incentive for policymakers to invest in preparation of detailed strategies 
and implementation plans. The motivation to move from ‘shallow’ to ‘deep’ policies is thus 




Table 1.4: Model Results for both Policy Adoption & Ambition 
 Policy Adoption1 Policy Ambition2 
 Direct Conditional Direct Conditional 
 Coef. (Std. 
Error) 
Coef. (Std. Error) Coef.(Std. Error) Coef. (Std. 
Error) 
Problem severity     
       Deaths from disasters -734727 1086182 -406612.7 365106.4 
 (460892.3) (474489.4)** (145088.3)*** (217675.2)* 
Vulnerability     
         Poverty rate .7710997 1.297577 .0599142 .1641693 
 (.4572591)* (.5582413)** (.1327461) (.138479) 
        Coastline miles .0011975 .001431 .0004529 .0004922 
 (.0003867)*** (.0004631)*** (.0000935)*** (.0000929)*** 
Political factors      
   Citizen ideology -.1555705 -.2894779 -.0474539 -.0779918 
       (liberal to conservative) (.089543)* (.1287961)** (.0362087) (.0360405)** 
   Government ideology .034583 .1476601 .0079921 .0504367 
       (liberal to conservative) (.0426904) (.0625351)** (.0141598) (.0184113)*** 
Interest Group Pressure     
         Environmental Groups 56.19498 2372.035 3017.746 3148.765 
 (1478.008) (1533.269) (622.4423)*** (610.5334)*** 
        Carbon Intensive Industry -.5899644 -.5804474 -.3728336 -.3747806 
 (.3020395)* (.3246915)* (.076306)*** (.0743169)*** 
State Resources       
        Median Income .0002609 .0003569 -.0000852 -.0000967 
 (.0001602) (.0001833)* (.0000468)* (.0000459)** 
Civic Engagement- Urbanization -.0158465 -.0607259 .0298272 .0217673 
         (.0911013) (.1027124) (.0211203) (.0216014) 
Policy Experience - Mitigation 8.815565 10.82546 .9642972 1.367073 
 (3.26603)*** (4.091057)*** (.7776952) (.8017281)* 
Horizontal Diffusion 5.798212 5.233646 5.881069 4.936665 
       (2.870924)** (2.931795) (1.296379)*** (1.260479)*** 
Conditional Effect     
Govt.Ideology * Problem 
Severity 
 -48709.51  -17701.26 
  (18093.26)***  (5383.419)*** 
Constant -29.15783 -50.36319 3.903509 1.678553 
 (16.75886)* (20.67169)** (5.457972) (5.364218) 
N  296 296 296 296 
Log likelihood -47.14634 -43.86388 -536.13981 -531.54516 
Wald ᵪ2 34.09 34.42 84.50 86.66 
Prob ᵪ2 0.0004 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 percent levels, respectively.  




Citizen and state ideology have mixed outcomes. I find that policymakers respond to their 
electorate while setting policy agendas, but this influence is not consistent across my direct 
effects and conditional effects models. Statistically, this could be due to the conditional effect 
sucking up a lot of the variation of other variables. This result calls for further research.  
My results on interest group pressure are unexpected. States with more environmentally 
active members are significantly more likely to prepare ambitious programs, but not influence 
SAP adoption. This implies that policymakers are partially responsive to pro-environmental 
pressures within their states and these subnational interest group pressures are only somewhat 
successful in mobilizing action. As predicted, the opposing group pressure from the carbon 
intensive industry does reduce the chances of states taking on SAPs. While this influence is 
modest in policy adoption (at the 0.10 level), once a state adopts the policies, the industry lobby 
is likely to pressure policymakers not to implement intensive goals. This may be understood as 
the carbon lobby pushing for more symbolic adoption of policies whereas the environmental 
groups support better strategies for addressing the impacts of climate change. This finding is 
indicative and deeper investigation is needed through case study analysis.  
Results for policy experience and horizontal diffusion present interesting patterns. While 
I expected both predictors to enhance the likelihood that a state would adopt a SAP and also 
influence the number of goals identified within that SAP, the results indicate that experience 
with  developing climate mitigation policy is more influential in adopting new SAPs, but this 
mitigation experience does not translate into more ambitious goals within a SAP.  External 
pressure from neighboring states however, does boost the number of goals or ambitiousness of a 
state’s SAP. When adopting SAPs, policymakers are more likely to maximize on their 




Yet it maybe that given that strategies for mitigation measures (reducing GHG emissions) are 
different than those for adaptation (building resilience), this experience is probably not sufficient 
to enhance the actual goals set in SAPs. However, as anticipated, when a state decides to adopt a 
policy, it may look to its neighbors through shared EPA regional offices to pool resources and 
information to overcome barriers of information to adaptation (Amundsen et al., 2010; Bierbaum 
et al., 2013; Biesbroek et al., 2013; Hamin, 2012), resulting in the preparation of more ambitious 
strategies. 
In keeping with findings of the DOI theory, my study shows that policy ideas do spread 
among neighboring states. Interestingly, when I test this influence with more complex dependent 
variables like policy ambitiousness, I find interesting nuances in how this effect may play out. 
Neighboring states are more likely to increase the propensity of other states to set more 
adaptation goals and this in doing so, encourage preparing better adaptation policies. This 
finding is promising for researchers and policymakers involved with climate adaptation.  
Conditional Effects: My interaction effects models tested the conditional relationship 
between government ideology and problem severity. As I expected, state governments are likely 
to respond to policy decisions based on the number of deaths caused by severe weather events in 
their jurisdiction. 
 The results for policy adoption show that at lower levels of deaths from disasters, a 
predominantly conservative government is not likely to adopt an SAP. However, as the intensity 
of environmental disasters increase and result in higher incidences of deaths, conservative 
government institutions are statistically more likely to respond with measures of policy adoption. 
This conditional effect is also prominent among liberal state governments. When the number of 




policy measures. It is important to note that government ideology was not a statistical predictor 
in my direct models, and only shows a likely conditional effect on SAPs.  
1.6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 Studies examining politics of climate adaptation among U.S. states are few. This chapter 
investigates the factors that predict the emergence and intensity of SAPs and the results deepen 
our understanding of this currently under-explored area. I find that broadly there are many 
commonalities between factors that predict climate mitigation and adaptation policy. Previous 
mitigation studies show the importance of state and citizen ideology and presence of carbon 
intensive industry and environmental groups. These predictors also matter for climate adaptation. 
In addition, given the high cost barriers to implementing adaptation measures, SAPs more likely 
influenced by the economic capacity of states and their geographic and human vulnerabilities.  
Second, I find differences between predictors that influence policy adoption and policy 
ambitiousness. While state vulnerabilities and economic capacity matter in both cases, I find that 
states are more motivated to prepare ambitious SAPs when they face greater threats of climate 
impacts and pressures from environmental interest groups. On the other hand, citizen ideologies 
and previous mitigation policy experience are more influential in policy adoption. These findings 
shed light on the theoretical under-pinning’s of the DOI theory, and the need for policy analysis 
using more complex dependent variables. Dependent variables that capture more detailed 
dimensions of policy adoption have the potential to capture finer information on predictors of 
importance. 
 Third, I explore conditional effects of state government ideologies and the severity of the 




effect on SAPs, when examined from the conditional perspective, both conservative and liberal 
state institutions were more likely to respond to increasing problem severity by adopting 
adaptation strategies. These finding are interesting and advance our understanding both 
theoretically and substantively.   
Lastly, regional diffusion matters in adaptation policy. Given that climate policy is still at 
its nascent stage, states within EPA regions tend to share information and resources among 
themselves and these regional actions impact a state’s policy decisions. Overall, the results 
contribute to the understanding of what factors predict the emergence of adaptation policies 
among states, and when states might move towards preparing more ambitious goals and 
programs. The findings also advance DOI theory by testing more complex measures for a 
dependent variable along with conditional predictor effects. This study is among the few to 
examine the politics surrounding climate adaptation policies in the United States. The results are 
promising and encourage further analysis and investigation into subnational climate change 





WHEN SIZE MATTERS: PREDICTORS OF ADAPTATION PLANNING IN SMALL, 
MEDIUM AND LARGE U.S. CITIES 
“Despite the ‘global’ nature of the challenge, over the past two decades it has become 
increasingly apparent that cities and regions are critical places for addressing climate 
change.” 
- Harriet Bulkeley, Cities and Subnational Governments (pp.464)  
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
By the year 2050, over seventy percent of the world’s population is expected to live in 
urban areas, intensifying the problem of cities and climate change (UNFPA, 2007). Urban areas 
are responsible for more than three-fourth global Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) making them 
geographic spaces with high emissions density (IPCC, 2007). At the same time, cities and 
municipalities host large concentration of infrastructure, economic activities and vulnerable 
populations that are at risk from sea level rise and extreme weather events,  (Bulkeley, 2011). 
They are often located in environmentally sensitive areas that are expected to witness adverse 
impacts of climate change. Events such as Hurricane Katrina and Sandy are a reminder of the 
vulnerabilities of cities, even in the United States. Many of the largest cities in the country face 
threats such as fragile water supplies and are along the coasts which are expected to experience 
more severe flooding and sea level rise (World Bank, 2010).   
With the lack of federal legislation, and in many cases state legislation to respond to 
climate change, cities and municipalities are taking action on their own initiative towards this 




approximately 30% of the national population) are formally signatories to the U.S. Conference of 
Mayors Climate Protection Agreement. While this agreement is primarily for reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), it reflects growing commitment by cities to reducing the 
impacts of climate change.  
Trends in adaptation at the local level have received relatively less attention than 
mitigation. Currently there are only 22 local governments11  that have their own adaptation plan 
or a section within climate action plans (ICLEI 2016). Interestingly, 117 local governments have 
signed the Compact of Mayors agreement committing to concrete adaptation planning within 
three years and 174 mayors have signed the Resilient Communities for America Agreement 
(RC4A). Resilience is viewed by many scholars as a more holistic approach to addressing the 
vulnerability of communities and ecosystems to climate change (Adger, 2006; Gallopín, 2006). 
The RC4A spearheads the “Paths to resilience” measures that reduce the vulnerability of a 
community through a broad array of initiatives such as climate preparedness, infrastructure 
renewal, enhancing energy security and economic prosperity (RC4A 2014).  
Even with federal and state government action, the role of cities will remain pertinent to 
developing policy solutions for climate change. Local governments have jurisdiction over 
various adaptation policy sectors such as transportation, drinking water, land use and 
infrastructure which are more likely to be tailored to the local climate impacts. Instead of a 
‘laundry-list of actions’ recommended in large scale plans for the federal or state governments, 
cities are in a unique position to customize their policy strategies to the specific challenges and 
opportunities faced by the local community (Boswell et al., 2012). With proximity to the policy 
                                                      
 




problem, they can also influence partnerships among the private sector and local community for 
successful implementation of different programs (Engel & Orbach, 2008). 
Recognizing this, the importance of local governments in implementing sustainable 
development was emphasized more than two decades ago in prominent reports such as the 1987 
Brundtland Report and the first Earth Summit in 1992. As part of the UN’s 1992 report, the 
Agenda 21 resolutions in particular highlighted local authorities’ role in implementing national 
and international policies, including climate change mitigation and adaptation (United Nations, 
1993). Yet there appears to be lack of preparedness for climate change adaptation among 
American cities.  
In the US, fewer than 250 local governments out of more than 30,000 places have made a 
commitment for action on climate adaption.  While this is a small number of governments, 
research and experience from other countries suggests that this number will grow. Therefore, it is 
critical to develop a better understanding of why some local governments engage in adaption 
planning while others do not. This insight will help government officials, interest groups and the 
public by identifying potential areas of focus to augment planning for adaptation.  
Currently cities adopting adaptation policy vary substantially in population size with 
small as well as large cities building climate resilience. Previous research suggests that smaller 
cities face greater challenges with gathering political will and fiscal capacity, and have been less 
likely to adopt sustainable policies (Lubell, Feiock, & Handy, 2009). The pattern for adaptation 
is different from other policy areas. This make cities an interesting case of “laboratories of 





In this chapter, I explore the factors that predict the variation in climate adaptation 
planning among local governments of different sizes. I ask the question – why are some cities 
adopting climate adaptation action while others are not? What factors predict the emergence of 
city action, and do these factors vary across cities of different sizes – mainly small, medium and 
large cities? I augment the Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) theory with insights from urban policy 
research to better understand how institutional characteristics such as mayor versus council-
manager systems, interest group pressures, fiscal capacity and pressures from the state 
government influence city policy adoption (Berry, 1994; Berry & Berry, 2007; Feiock, Francis, 
& Kassekert, 2010).  
The DOI theory is almost exclusively applied to states or countries (some exceptions see 
(Godwin & Schroedel, 2000; Krause, 2011; Skeer et al., 2004), and merits greater application at 
the local level. Scholarship on urban politics finds that municipalities have been particularly 
influenced by business interests and more inclined to act on preferences of industry lobbyists 
(Peterson 2012; Stone 1980). Local governments have also been likely to engage community and 
non-profit organizations to implement policy initiatives (Boswell et al., 2012). These 
collaborative relationships expose urban governments to popular public support and influence 
their policy choices, especially among the local authorities following the mayor-council form of 
government (Bae & Feiock, 2013). I also apply DOI theory to a relatively untested area of urban 
politics by examining factors across a range of small, medium and large cities.  
I use a multilevel model to structurally capture how cities are nested within political, 
economic and policy structure of states. Applying a cross-sectional analysis for the year 2015, I 
test the DOI theory on a sample of adopter-cities matched with non-adopter cities. Given the 




Separate models are run for all cities taken together, and then subgroups of cities based on 
population size of small, medium and large places. I find that state level characteristics and 
policy experience do not influence city’s decision to plan for adaptation. Cities are more likely to 
respond to internal factors like social vulnerability, presence of carbon intensive industry and the 
structure of the government.  
Further, I find that smaller cities respond differently from medium and larger cities. 
Smaller cities are more likely to be influenced by interest group politics with the presence of 
competing pressures from environmental groups and the industry lobby. It is encouraging that 
among these opposing factors, a greater presence of environmental interests in smaller cities can 
help policymakers overcome industry resistance and adopt plans. Larger cities are more likely to 
be influenced by public opinion than the vulnerabilities of the community. These preliminary 
findings elicit deeper investigation into the urban politics surrounding climate adaptation 
planning. In the chapter I first present a background to climate change adaptation and cities in 
the United States. I then provide the theoretical framework, and describe my data and methods. 
Next, I present my results and discussion and conclude the paper with avenues for future 
research. 
2.2. BACKGROUND ON CITIES AND CLIMATE ADAPTATION 
 Despite global efforts to reduce GHG emissions, scientists have projected that there will 
be unavoidable consequences of climate change that will require some level of adaptation. 
Planning for these risks poses many challenges, including the uncertainty in predicting the 




have been evolving to capture the complexity of the problem, however translating these models 
to the local scale adds another dimension of uncertainty (IPCC, 2014).  
 Adaptation planning requires a clearer understanding of the projected rate and magnitude 
of risks. Against these risks, an evaluation of the vulnerability and capacity of the local 
community to withstand changes is needed. Based on these assessments, holistic adaptation 
strategies can be identified, prioritized and implemented (Boswell et al., 2012). Over the years 
cities have developed diverse adaptation strategies including emergency preparedness 
mechanisms, ecosystem protection policies, land use changes, health initiatives and 
infrastructure design (Shi et al., 2015). For example, Ann Arbor, MI has experienced nearly 25% 
more precipitation in the last 30 years (1981-2010) in comparison to the preceding thirty years 
(1951-1980). To respond to this, city officials are developing ‘Green Streets’ to increase natural 
infrastructure for better infiltration on streets and build resilience of the storm-water system of 
the city’s capacity (RC4A, 2016).  
Similarly, Washington, DC has taken initiatives to ameliorate the increase in heat waves 
by encouraging ‘green roofs’ and creating tree canopies that cool the city, reduce energy use and 
slow storm-water runoff (RC4A, 2016). Coastal cities like Miami, FL have made approximately 
$10 million dollar investment to improve the drainage system and flood mitigation projects to 
prepare for more frequent and severe storms and sea-level rise (RC4A, 2016). Some cities have 
included adaptation planning within Climate Action Plans (CAPs - primarily focus on reducing 
GHGs), while others have integrated climate change in local hazard mitigation plans or prepared 
free-standing adaptation plans (Boswell et al., 2012).  
Labeling Climate Adaptation: Defining the boundary of adaptation policy can be 




increase resilience to the negative impacts from climate change. Currently there is no consensus 
among scholars on what constitutes an adaptation policy. Some argue that for adaptation to be 
effective it must be integrated into different sectors, often termed as ‘mainstreaming adaptation’, 
and cannot be made on a ‘standalone” basis (Biesbroek et al., 2010; Henstra, 2015; Tompkins et 
al., 2010). This approach has advantages like speed of strategy adoption by by-passing the 
process of the uptake of a new plan to directly changes within an existing policy (Hamin, 2012). 
Many scholars studying sustainability policies have utilized this approach and examined plans 
that directly and indirectly address the issue. Eg. Berke & Conroy (2000) evaluate 30 
comprehensive plans, some which are specifically prepared for sustainable development, and 
some that have indirect sustainability benefits.  
However the case of climate change, and developing policies and programs to insulate 
communities from the negative consequences of climate change, is different from general 
sustainable development policies, and the explicit labeling is beneficial. Dupuis & Biesbroek 
(2013) make a clear the distinction between ‘contributive’ policies – those that are not designed 
for climate adaptation but may have overlapping benefits; and ‘concrete’ policies that are 
explicitly created to plan for climate change. They propose focusing on the policies specifically 
labeled to build resilience and promote adaptation in the face of climate change  because “only 
the policy activities that prove to be highly intentional and sufficiently substantial should be 
defined as adaptation policy” (pp.1481).   
This research is focuses on local governments that have specifically committed 
themselves to promoting adaptation and resilience in the face of climate change. While there are 
likely climate adaption co-benefits to many obliquely labeled policies that cities can adopt, it is 




Policies labeled as adaptation have a specific intentionality underpinning them, and are important 
to examine in their own right.  
Narrowing the study focus to explicitly labeled adaptation policies has some advantages 
and does not diminish the usefulness of studying co-benefit policies. For example, climate 
adaptation overlaps with natural hazards mitigation strategies. Yet there is a need to differentiate 
between the two. Hazards mitigation does not include overarching strategies like ecosystem 
changes and is inadequate in capturing future risks and changes that stem from climate change 
(Boswell et al., 2012). The nature of the problem of climate change necessities both – planning 
for cross-sectoral strategies and incorporating future risks to build long-term resilience. Political 
commitments and policies to build resilience that do not explicitly include projections of climate 
risk and climate uncertainties are insufficient in preparing for climate change. For these reasons, 
my study focuses on resilience commitment that is explicitly labeled climate adaptation. 
Previous Adaptation Research: Despite financial and human capital constraints, local 
governments may be in a strong position to pursue climate adaptation and resilience. Not only 
are local governments more likely to successfully engage that public and understand local norms, 
but local control over land use and building practices can be an important component 
underpinning climate adaptation and community resilience. 
Scholarship on adaptation planning at the local level has primarily been qualitative in 
nature. The first wave of studies conceptualized what constituted adaptation (Smith et al., 2000; 
Smith et al., 2009; UNDP, 2005) and differentiated between vulnerability, adaptive capacity and 
adaptation. These debates resulted in the development of various frameworks to analyze factors 
that support or constrain adaptation processes (André, 2013). The second generation of 




analysis) and complimented them with interviews and small-N case studies of cities 
implementing these plans (Moser & Ekstrom, 2010; Shi et al., 2015).  
They find that currently adaptation plans are incremental changes pursuing low-regret 
strategies and co-benefits (Bierbaum et al., 2013; Tang et al., 2010; Wang, 2013b) and primarily 
reactive to extreme weather events (Amundsen et al., 2010) . For instance, King County, WA has 
been declared a federal flood disaster 12 times since 1990, and as a reaction to on-going threats, 
has completed three flood protection infrastructure projects and helped relocate chronically 
flooded homes (RC4A, 2016). Interviews and surveys with key government officials reveal 
barriers to adaptation planning; frequently local institutions lack the knowledge, expertise, and 
resources to develop or implement strategies (Biesbroek et al., 2013; Carlson & McCormick, 
2015).  
Differentiating Across City Size: Larger cities with higher concentration of people, 
transportation and infrastructure, generally tend to be higher emitters of GHG emissions. 
Previous studies on climate mitigation have primarily focused on cities with population greater 
than 25,000 (E.g. (Bae & Feiock, 2013; Krause, 2011; Sharp, Daley, & Lynch, 2011) (to name a 
few). While these studies are important, they do not include an important segment of smaller 
cities in suburban areas. Suburban areas with populations less than 25,000 people host more than 
half the population of the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010), making them important 
entities for consideration. 
Irrespective of size, all cities and metropolitan areas have the authority to develop 
policies surrounding issues such as land use, economic development, infrastructure and 
environmental protection. However, with differences in size we often see variation in resources 




poorer understanding of the problem (Carter & Culp, 2010). They may also respond differently 
to interest group pressures (Lubell et al., 2009).   
Recognizing the need for closer examination, a small-N study by (Homsy & Warner, 
2015) finds that smaller cities are better able to frame the issue of climate change mitigation to 
the local population and offers greater opportunities for policy adoption. Smaller places also 
allow for more collaboration and coordination within a federalist system. While we see the 
importance of testing predictors among different cities in mitigation studies, such work is still 
missing in climate adaptation. This leads to an incomplete understanding of climate adaptation 
policy decision-making within local governments. In this study I examine factors that predict the 
emergence of policies among cities as a whole (all cities) as well as explore differences among 
small, medium and large cities (also see Table 2.1 with city descriptions).12  
Research Gap: These findings are valuable and have contributed to the initial 
understanding of adaptation planning. However, being limited in their scope, the findings are not 
generalizable. There is a need to perform a national level local government assessment of factors 
that predict the emergence of adaptation planning and commitment. Large-N studies have been 
conducted for climate mitigation pointing to factors like climate stress of being close to the 
coastline, political ideology of citizens, local government structure and fiscal capacity of a city 
impacting the likelihood of policy adoption (Krause, 2011; Zahran et al., 2008). However there 
are noteworthy differences between characteristics of mitigation and adaptation policies. 
Adaptation policies have relatively greater private benefits which may increase their likelihood 
                                                      
 
12 Population criteria of small, medium and large cities mimic the broader practice of city stratification used by the 
U.S. Census Bureau. Small Cities (Population less than 25,000), Medium Cities (Population between 25,000 and 




of adoption (Niles & Lubell, 2012), thereby requiring a separate analysis of the politics 
surrounding it.  
  

























































Alabama 3 1 0 2 Montana 1 0 1 0 
Alaska 2 1 0 1 Nebraska 0 0 0 0 
Arizona 5 1 0 4 Nevada 1 0 0 1 
Arkansas 0 0 0 0 New Hampshire 0 0 0 0 
California 45 9 21 15 New Jersey 1 0 1 0 
Colorado 8 4 1 3 New Mexico 4 2 2 0 
Connecticut 2 0 0 2 New York 9 2 5 2 
Delaware 0 0 0 0 North Carolina 6 1 3 2 
Florida 27 7 14 6 North Dakota 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 4 2 0 2 Ohio 6 1 1 4 
Hawaii 0 0 0 0 Oklahoma 1 0 0 1 
Idaho 1 1 0 0 Oregon 4 0 2 2 
Illinois 6 1 4 1 Pennsylvania 6 4 0 2 
Indiana 3 1 2 0 Rhode Island 1 0 0 1 
Iowa 5 1 3 1 South Carolina 2 1 0 1 
Kansas 3 3 0 0 South Dakota 0 0 0 0 
Kentucky 1 1 0 0 Tennessee 5 2 0 3 
Louisiana 2 1 0 1 Texas 10 3 3 4 
Maine 1 0 1 0 Utah 2 1 0 1 
Maryland 8 5 2 1 Vermont 2 1 1 0 
Massachusetts 8 2 5 1 Virginia 7 0 3 4 
Michigan 8 1 4 3 Washington 8 1 4 3 
Minnesota 4 1 0 3 West Virginia 0 0 0 0 
Mississippi 4 3 0 1 Wisconsin 5 2 1 2 
Missouri 4 1 1 2 Wyoming 0 0 0 0 
  
We know little about the reasons for variation in action among cities. Why do some cities 




predict the emergence of this commitment to foster a community’s adaptive capacity, and do 
these predictors have varying influences on cities of different sizes? Building on previous work, 
my chapter explores these questions by testing the influence of various political, socio-economic, 
and environmental factors within a city on the likelihood of policy commitment. 
2.3. THEORY AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
The Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) theory describes policy innovation as the act of 
adopting a ‘new’ policy or program, often in the context of new to the government adopting it 
(Walker, 1969). This theory is well suited to understand why some governments adopt policy 
while others do not (Berry & Berry, 1990, 2007). While DOI has mainly been applied to state 
level empirical studies, there is growing research that explores local adoption of regulatory 
policies such as gun control (Godwin & Schroedel, 2000), anti-smoking legislation (Skeer et al., 
2004) and climate mitigation (Krause, 2011).  
Initially the DOI theory proposed that policy innovation occurred based on either internal 
characteristics (Walker, 1969) or solely due to external influences (Gray, 1973). Recent 
scholarship proposes that both explanations - characteristics within a government and external 
pressures can simultaneously contribute to policy making (Berry & Berry, 1990, 2007; Mintrom 
& Vergari, 1998). Urban politics scholars point to local decision-making being tied more closely 
to interest group pressures, fiscal capacities, community characteristics and institutional structure 
(Feiock et al., 2010).  
These internal characteristics are expected to have differing influence based on city size. 
Larger cities are more likely to have sustainable development commitments to build adaptive 




and often lack the capacity to invest is administrative resources for planning (Lubell et al., 2009). 
In addition, cities also look to their neighbors and are influenced by state government actions and 
incentives (Hanna, 2005). Each of these factors is explained in detail below. 
Internal Determinants: Internal characteristics of a city like its political, social, 
economic and environmental conditions can function as motivators, obstacles or resources for 
policy adoption (Feiock & West, 1993; Lubell et al., 2009; Walker, 1969). 
 Severity of the problem can be an important motivator for government action. Scientific 
evidence for climate change points to increase in many weather related impacts which are 
expected to damage property, ecosystems and human lives. Recent research shows that an 
increased risk of extreme weather events tends to encourage governments to take adaptation 
measures (Berkhout et al., 2006; Naess et al., 2011).  
 
 Hypothesis 1: Cities experiencing more severe extreme weather impacts will be more 
likely to commit to taking action for adaptation. Moreover, I expect that larger cities with 
greater concentration of people, industries and infrastructure will face greater losses and be 
more likely to commit than smaller cities. 
 
While environmental disasters may hit a location, the impacts from a disaster are not 
uniformly distributed.  In other words, within a community, some neighborhoods will be more 
vulnerable than others. Low income individuals and communities, socially isolated individuals 
and individuals who live in deteriorated or decaying infrastructure face higher risk from climate 
related disasters. Such individuals lack the capacity to bounce back after the disaster and 




evident across natural disasters, leading researchers to investigate ways to measure 
vulnerabilities of communities. Income, education, race & class and employment opportunities 
largely contribute to the coping capacities of communities and individuals (Battersby, Mitchell & 
Cutter, 2011).      
 
 Hypothesis 2: Cities with greater percent of population vulnerable to climate impacts are 
more likely to build resilience and adopt policies. Similarly, smaller cities are likely to have 
lower coping capacities and I expect them to be more likely than larger cities to respond to 
social vulnerabilities.  
 
Public opinion and citizen ideology also shape the types of policies formulated in a city. 
Within a federalist system like the US, local governments are lowest in hierarchy and tend to be 
easier to access by citizens. The nature of local politics suggests that not only would citizens 
have easier access to their local officials to express their opinions, but also that local officials 
should be highly aware, and indeed even share many if not all of the local preferences (Sharp, 
2012).  
The perception of risk, proximity to the problem, knowledge and understanding of the 
issue, as well as social attitudes can be a significant driver for policy adoption (Tierney et al., 
2001). For climate change, this is particularly imperative given the contentious politics 
surrounding the issue. Public awareness and perception of the climate risks affect the willingness 
to prepare mitigation and adaptation policies (Carlson & McCormick, 2015). Studies find that 




and the need for policy action, policy-makers respond to such opinion and adopt strategies 
(Brulle et al., 2012).  
 
Hypothesis 3A: Public opinion will directly shape the likelihood that a local government 
develops a climate adaptation plan. Cities with a greater proportion of citizens that believe in 
and are concerned with climate change are more likely to commit to building local adaptive 
capacity and resilience to climate change. I expect this influence to be relatively equal across 
city size.  
 
 Previous research suggests that the configuration of a city’s executive branch in its local 
institution shape the outcome of policies (Feiock et al., 2010; Ramírez, 2009; Sharp et al., 2011). 
In general, cities can be grouped into two institutional structures, mainly council-manager or 
commission governments and mayor-council governments. Mayor-council cities are based on 
separation of power with the executive authority with the mayor and legislative branch with the 
city council. The council-manager governments have a single branch with consolidated power in 
the city council, and the council hires a professional manager for city operations (Bae & Feiock, 
2013). 
Mayor-council forms of government tend to be more politicized, particularly compared to 
the council-manager counterparts.  Mayors tend to pursue more goals & policies that provide 
political advantage and increase their ability to be re-elected.  In comparison, council-manager 
forms of government are often more insulated from local politics and with a professional 
manager guided by professional norms. Given that climate change is a controversial issue, 




longer time horizons like those required to build adaptive capacity to climate change, as well as 
be less affected by the politics surrounding the issue (Clingermayer & Feiock, 2014). In addition, 
since the council-manager systems hire professional managers for the day to day operations of 
the city (Bae & Feiock, 2013), they may be in a stronger position to understand the technical and 
scientific aspects of local climate change, and protected from the political debates, pursue 
climate adaptation planning. 
 
Hypothesis 3B: Cities with council-manager forms of government are more likely to 
commit to build adaptive capacity and facilitate resilience, than mayor-council governments. I 
expect this influence to be relatively equal across city size. 
 
Urban politics often frames local politicians as suppliers of public goods and services, 
responding to the demands of both interest groups and general demands within the local 
jurisdiction. Through a pluralist framework, these interest groups compete amongst each other 
for the policy outcomes of their preference. Local governments respond to these pressures and 
meet the demands of those interests that yield maximum resources to the politicians (Lubell et 
al., 2009). Often, development and business growth interests have substantial influence in local 
politics. Comparatively, public interests are more diffused and this leads to unequal power 
among the interest groups (Stone 1980) that results in a stratification of power within a local 
community. Business (organized) groups generally have higher levels of influence, while the 
public – a more diffuse interest group pressure, if unified at all – tends to have influence within 




manufacturing and industry sectors in policymaking (Lubell et al., 2009; Peterson 1995; Stone 
1980). 
Within this context of interest group pressures, studies find that a stronger presence of 
environmental groups can lead to more participation of cities in environmental protection and 
sustainability programs (Portney, 2009). And this trend is also visible for adopting climate 
mitigation policies (Zahran et al., 2008).  Climate politics, however, is likely to generate both 
supportive and oppositional interest groups vying for influence.  
This seems true for mitigation policies that seek to limit emissions. Carbon intensive 
industries such as manufacturing firms tend to resist policies that aim to reduce GHG emissions 
due to increased costs or expected change of practices (Krause, 2011; Zahran et al., 2008). It is 
not clear if this pattern will hold for adaptation, or if a commitment to adaptation will be far less 
controversial given that it may not entail behavior change on the part of the emitters. With regard 
to city size, smaller cities have relatively more avenues for interest groups to negotiate and assert 
their influence. Bigger cities tend to have larger bureaucratic hurdles and are relatively less 
permeable (Lubell et al., 2009).   
 
Hypothesis 4A: Cities with greater presence of environmental groups are more likely to 
engage in building resilience for climate change. Additionally, I expect interest group pressures 
to be more impactful among smaller cities.  
 
Hypothesis 4B: Cities with larger presence of carbon intensive industries receive more 
oppositional pressures and are less likely to build resilience, and this pressure is expected to be 





 Planning for adaptation entails additional expenditure and resources. Urban scholars 
suggest that larger cities have greater resources to devote for administrative expenses incurred in 
planning than smaller ones (Burby & May, 1998). The need for resources is exasperated in the 
case of climate adaptation. A key challenge for climate adaptation is the relatively high cost of 
implementing strategies (Bierbaum et al., 2013; Biesbroek et al., 2013). Governments with weak 
fiscal health are less likely to adopt new policies and programs (Lowry, 2005) and the 
availability of resources can pose as a barrier. This is especially true for smaller cities that are 
more likely to lack the fiscal capacity and resources required to build climate resilience (Carter 
& Culp, 2010; Lubell et al., 2009).  
 
Hypothesis 5: Cities with greater economic resources and capacity are more likely to 
pursue a commitment to adaptation. Moreover, I expect that larger cities having relatively better 
resource capacities than smaller cities are more likely to participate in adaptation.  
 
External Pressure: In the federalist system of the US, the top-down pressure is more 
constrained between local and state governments, than with state and federal authorities. This 
makes urban politics an interesting case to test the DOI theory. While the basic insights of the 
theory will hold, the variation in the unit of analysis (local governments) tests external pressure 
under a more constrained relationship than the typical case of states.  
City governments can experience external pressures such as policy action by neighboring 





Horizontal Diffusion: The DOI theory provides two primary explanations to describe the 
spread of policy ideas from one city to another. First, cities may look to their geographic 
neighbors (Grossback, 2004) to test the success or failure of new policies and select those that 
they perceive as beneficial to them (social learning model) (Mooney & Lee, 1995). For example, 
Chicago, IL has been a leader among city adaptation policies, both in terms of early plan 
adoption and intensity of strategies to build resilience. The Chicago Climate Action Plan-2008 
became a benchmark for other cities to follow through (RC4A, 2016). In fact organizations like 
ICELI provide a platform for cities and local governments to come together to share information 
and experiences on adaptation planning.   
Second, cities might compete with each other to gain an economic advantage for their 
jurisdiction and emulate policy ideas adopted by their neighbors (economic competition) (Berry 
& Berry, 2007). To illustrate, the federal and some state governments provide resources to help 
governments plan and implement resilience strategies. Taking the health sector as an example, 
the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has developed a framework on Building 
Resilience Against Climate Effects (BRACE) and allocated funds to pilot-test this framework 
among sixteen states and two cities (CDC, 2010). Funds such as these are limited and city 
governments are likely to compete to gain an economic advantage.  
The diffusion of ideas is more likely to be prominent among smaller cities. Planners in 
smaller cities face a greater challenge with lack of knowledge about the problem and the 
technical know-how for solutions (Lubell et al., 2009; Svara, 2011). Small city governments that 
want to build resilience would tend to learn from and build networks with neighboring 





Hypothesis 6: Cities with neighbors participating in climate adaptation and resilience 
are more likely to make commitments for adaptation action (horizontal diffusion). Furthermore, 
smaller cities are more likely to imitate policies adopted by their neighbors. 
 
Vertical Diffusion: Local climate adaptation among cities also provides a good background to 
test vertical diffusion or influence of state and federal policies at the local level (Shipan &  
Volden, 2006). With the void in federal adaptation policy, I explore vertical diffusion mainly in 
the context of state action. In the case of cities, there are competing hypothesis for vertical 
diffusion. First, action at state level can lead to increased diffusion or “snowball effect” at lower 
levels of government (Shipan & Volden, 2006). Alternatively, a “pressure valve effect” maybe 
observed with reduced probability of local action under the assumption that the states are already 
undertaking sufficient action (Shipan & Volden, 2006).  Within this context, city size is likely to 
matter.  Smaller cities may lack the resources or technical capacity necessary to pursue a 
commitment to climate adaption (Carter & Culp, 2010; Homsy & Warner, 2015). Resource 
limitations may encourage some small cities to seek out support from state governments or free-
ride on action taken by higher levels of authority.  
Top-down pressures from the state can manifest in various forms and in this study I focus on 
three main – state-level policy experience, government ideology and strength of the carbon 
industry. More liberal governments are more likely to support policies for climate change 
(Zahran et al., 2008; Zia, 2013). We also know that oppositional pressures through the presence 
of larger carbon intensive industries at the state level can potentially filter down to the local level 





Hypothesis 7a: Local governments within states that have adaptation plans, have democratic 
government institutions and smaller carbon intensive industries  are more likely to results in a 
trickle-down effect for city level action (positive effect); and this effect is expected to be more 
pronounced among smaller cities.  
 
Hypothesis 7b: Conversely, local governments within adaptation proactive states – policy 
action, democratic institutions and smaller carbon intensive industries, will reduce their city-
level initiatives under the assumption that sufficient action is already underway (negative effect). 
This influence is more likely among smaller cities than larger ones.   
2.4. DATA & METHODS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: While limited in number, cities have made commitments 
to build adaptive capacity to the impacts of climate change. Some cities, such as New York 
(NY), Denver (CO) and Austin (TX) have developed stand-alone policies for climate adaptation. 
Other cities have signaled a commitment to building adaptive capacity by becoming signatories 
to public agreements that promote the city’s commitment to build climate resilience. Two of the 
main global and national programs of prominence in the country are – the Compact of Mayors 
and the Resilient Communities for America (RC4A) Campaign. These programs are primarily 
for climate adaptation and differ from mitigation priorities that are expressed in other programs 
like the U.S. Council of Mayors, Cities for Climate Protection and C40 Climate Leadership.  
  Resilient Communities for America Campaign brings together local elected officials to, 
in the face of climate change, create more resilient cities, towns and counties. The program 




preparing for extreme weather changes; (2) expanding renewable and energy security; (3) 
strengthening infrastructure; and (4) strengthening local economies. The aim of this multi-year 
program is to gain leadership commitment and work in close collaboration with organizations 
that provide access to helpful and relevant resources and tools. Leading organizations like 
ICELI-Local Governments for Sustainability, the National League of Cities, the U.S. Green 
Building Council and the World Wildlife Fund together run the RC4A program. They provide 
their members support by sharing best practices on planning and implementing resilience-
enhancing activities (RC4A, 2016). 
 On similar lines, the Compact of Mayors is a global initiative that requires cities to make 
a three year commitment to perform activities for both mitigation and adaptation to climate 
change. In order to be awarded the official “Commitment” badge, in the context of adaptation, a 
city is required to identify climate risks, conduct a climate change vulnerability assessment, and 
establish an action plan to build reliance (Compact of Mayors, 2016). These activities under the 
Commitment are aimed to support cities in planning for climate adaptation by providing a 
guiding framework of steps that will strengthen the quality of plans and their implementation.  
 For the purpose of this study, cities participating in these two programs, as well as those 
with stand-alone policies are considered as having a commitment to fostering climate adaption 
and resilient communities. With my focus on city level governments, adaptation initiatives by 
counties are not included in the study. A total of 235 cities are identified as having a public 
commitment to building climate resilient communities and enhance climate adaption. The 
dependent variable for the study is dichotomous to represent a city’s commitment (or lack 




Sample: The United States has over 30,000 general purpose local governments, with 
nearly 19,500 municipal governments and 16,500 townships (National League of Cities, 2016). 
Of this total, as mentioned above, only 235 local governments have made concrete commitments 
for climate adaptation and resilience activities. Given the infrequency of occurrence of cities of 
interest (policy adopters), this study lends itself to “rare events” and a sample of the entire 
universe of cities will highly underestimate the probability of the dependent variable (King & 
Zeng, 2001). Rare events have theoretical and substantive significance and it is not uncommon 
for researchers to focus on events such as the number of suicides, divorces and deaths within a 
population, or the occurrence of wars (Lacy, 1997). Studying rare-events requires more efficient 
research designs to construct unbiased samples (King & Zeng, 2001).  
Table 2.2: Description of Cities in Study Sample 
CITIES FOR THE STUDY 
City Size* Population Criteria* N  
Small Cities Less than 25,000 136 (68 policy adopters) 
Medium Cities  Between 25,000 to 100,000 170 (85 policy adopters) 
Large Cities More than 100,000 164 (82 policy adopters) 
Total 
 
470 (235 policy adopters) 
NOTE: *Population criteria of small, medium and large cities mimic the broader practice of city stratification used 
by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 My sample is created by first identifying the adopter cities – those with stand-alone 
adaptation plans and members of RC4A and the Compact of Mayors. I then add census 
information city population to help group the cities into small, medium and large cities 
(populations <25,000; 25,000 – 100,000; and >100,000 respectively). This is followed by a 
random matching process of cities that have adopted policies with cities that have not (King, 
Keohane, & Verba, 1994), using the criteria of ‘city-size within a state’. For example, Boston in 




climate adaption.  With this city identified, I then assemble a list of similarly sized cities in the 
same state, and randomly sample from that list to select a comparison case for this dataset. 
Through this process, Springfield, MA was included in the data set to represent a similarly sized 
city that has not pursued a public commitment to enhancing its climate resilience. Through this 
process, each of the 235 cities are randomly matched, making the study sample N=470 (Refer 
Table 2.2).  
Table 2.3: Variable Description of City (Level-1) and State (Level-2) Predictors 
Concept Variable Operation Sign Data Source 
Dependent Variable 
Policy Adoption Dichotomous variable – city with 
plans + resilience signatories + 
sign Compact of Mayors coded as 
1, cities with no plans or in-
progress coded 0  
 
 Resilient Cities for 
America (RC4A), ICLEI,  
& Compact of Mayors 
(2015) 




Count of number of extreme 
weather related events in a county 
aggregated over a period of five 
years (no need for average) 
 




Social Vulnerability Social Vulnerability Index = [ % 
low-income +%minority + % less 
than high school education + 
%linguistic isolation + 
%individuals under age 5 + 
%individuals over age 65]/6 
calculated for a city. This formula 
is based on Environmental 
Protection Agency – 
Environmental Justice Indicators 
(EJSCREEN)   
+ American Community 
Survey (ACS) five-year 
summary, U.S. Census 




Concept Variable Operation Sign Data Source 
Political Factors 
Public Opinion Index created for percentage of 
population with public opinion 
supporting climate change on 7 
variables – global warming is 
caused by humans, worried about 
impacts, harm them personally, 
harm people in the U.S., harm 
future generations, and is 
happening now and within next 
10 years; calculated at county 
level 
 




Govt. Ideology Dichotomous variable coded as 1 
if the city has a mayor-council 
form of government and 0 if the 
city has a city manager-council 
form of government  
 
 ICMA and Hand-Coded 
through internet searches 
Interest Group Pressures 
Environmental 
Organizations 
Count of environmental 
nonprofits in a county  
+ National Center for 
Charitable Statistics 




Percentage of jobs that are 
directly connected with high 
carbon emitting industries – 
mining, utilities, construction and 
manufacturing sector of a city.  
 
- American Community 
Survey (ACS) five-year 
summary, U.S. Census 
Bureau (2014) 
City Resources 
Fiscal Capacity Median Income  of a city + American Community 
Survey (ACS) five-year 





Count of number of individuals in 
a city 
 American Community 
Survey (ACS) five-year 










Total number of cities within a 
state with mitigation policies 
+ Calculated using city 
policy adopters – ICLEI, 




Multilevel Model Indicators 
(Level-2) 
1) State Adaptation 
Experience: Climate 
Adaptation Plan 
 (coded 0=no policy, 
1=policy adopted, 
1=policy in-progress) 
2) Government Ideology 
(2013): Ideology of state’s 
elected officials across 
legislature, senate, and 
governors on a liberal to 
conservative continuum 
3) Carbon Intensive 
Industry:  
Percent of carbon 
intensive industry 
contribution to total state 
GDP from 4 main sectors 
- Mining, Utilities, 
Construction, and 
Manufacturing  
+ / -  




2) Berry, Ringquist, 





3) U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
(2013) 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Based on the DOI theory, several independent 
variables representing internal determinants and external pressure on city’s decision-making are 
used in this analysis. These are divided into two levels of analysis – Level-1 is the 470 cities, and 
Level-2 is the 50 states.13 
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A. City Variables (Level-1) 
Problem Severity: Cities are likely to build resilience to local impacts of climate change 
such as extreme weather events. I measure the intensity of the problem through the frequency of 
extreme weather events in a county.  The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) maintains long term data on over 30 different types of weather related incidents such as 
droughts, floods, heat waves, wild fires and storms. I aggregate these events over a period of five 
years to create a count on the incidents of extreme events for a location. Previous studies have 
used number of environmental disasters to capture the extent of threat from potential climate 
impacts (Battersby et al., 2011; Borden & Cutter, 2008; Zahran et al., 2008).  
Social Vulnerability: Vulnerability to climate change is contingent on the capacity of 
individuals within their communities to cope with environment disaster (Adger, 2006). Assessing 
vulnerabilities is a way to identify the consequences from, and risk to climate impacts, and is 
often calculated based on various socio-economic characteristics of a community.  I use the 
EPA’s Environmental Justice framework as a guideline to create an index for social 
vulnerability. EPA’s EJSCREEN provides a county level social vulnerability index calculated 
through key characteristics of a disadvantaged population (EPA, 2015). The index aggregates six 
factors - the percent of low income households, race and ethnicity based minority population, 
people with less than high school education, linguistic isolation, children under the age 5 and 
adults over the age 64. Following EPA’s methods, I replicate this index using data from the 





Political Factors: Citizens opinion on climate change is a good indicator of the 
preferences of the electorate within a jurisdiction. Whether the mass public supports climate 
change and perceives the need for government action to ameliorate the problem, can give a good 
indication of the average ideological preference of the mass public on the issue. Public opinion in 
favor of climate adaptation is a key driver for local governments to build climate ready 
communities. 
The Yale Program on Climate Change Communication provides data on state and local 
public opinion on climate change. In 2015 they conducted a state and local government climate 
change opinion study with various questions that capture people’s views on the knowledge, risk 
and perceptions of climate change (Howe et al., 2015). While most of my other independent 
variables are lagged by one year or more relative to the dependent variable, this survey is 
conducted in 2015 – the year of the dependent variable in analysis. Since we do not expect high 
fluctuations in public opinion over a period of one year, and given the limitation that the survey 
is only conducted once and for the year 2015, I include this measure of public opinion on climate 
change without the lag of one year.  
From the survey, I select responses on seven relevant questions - whether global warming 
is caused by human activities; people were worried about global warming; it will harm them 
personally; it will harm people in the U.S., it will harm future generations; and whether global 
warming will start harming people in the U.S. now and within the next 10 years. These questions 
aim to capture a holistic attitude of people on climate change. Since these variables are tapping 
into the same concept (opinion on climate change), for parsimony, I collapse them into a single 
index (with a Cronbach Alpha of 0.971). The final measure is a score for the percentage of the 




The structure of the city government is also an important political factor likely to shape a 
local’s commitment to pursuing climate adaption. City governments can broadly be divided into 
council-manager form and mayor-council form (coded as 0 and 1 respectively). The distinction 
between the forms of government reflects the fragmentation or consolidation of political 
authority and its respective impact on politics. Since government institutions are important in 
passing policies and laws, their isolation or involvement with the politics surrounding the issue 
becomes paramount. I collect information on the forms of government partly through the 
International City/County Management Association (ICMA) survey on the Municipal Form of 
Government-2006. Since this survey is only conducted for a sample of cities and primarily 
medium and large cities, information on many places in my sample were not found. For the 
remaining cities, I searched local government web sites to correctly code the type of city 
government.  
Interest Group Pressures: To capture the pressure from environmental groups I utilize 
data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) on environmental nonprofits 
(Core Data Files for 501(c)(3) organizations). These records are only available for the lowest 
denominator of a county and up to 2013. It can be expected that environmental groups would 
influence policy-making not just for the city in which they are registered, but possibly for a 
broader geographic area covering neighboring regions. Other studies investigating climate 
change policies have also applied this logic, and used the measure of environmental 
organizations at the county level (Wang, 2013a).  For these reason, I use this measure for 
environmental group pressure at the county level.  
Since climate change will require high GHG emitting industries to take measures to 




Emerging research on mitigation points to growing influence of the industry lobbies that see 
climate policies as a threat to their businesses requiring measures that would come at a cost to 
them (Brulle, 2014; Dunlap & Jacques, 2013). Since climate adaptation may not entail behavior 
change on part of the emitters, it is not clear if this oppositional pressure will hold for building 
resilience. On the other hand, the industry lobby could be opposed to opening the door for any 
and all action related to climate change, including adaptation.  
To capture this opposing pressure, I create a measure to capture the percentage of jobs 
within a city that are directly connected with high carbon emitting industries – mainly mining, 
utilities, construction and manufacturing sector. These two variables are commonly used to 
capture the relative strength of environmental interests versus industry lobbyists on an issue 
(Krause, 2011; Pollak et al., 2011).  
City Resources: The capacity of a city, especially fiscal resources are an important factor 
in enabling a government to take policy action. Cities with higher level of economic resources 
are more equip to overcome financial barriers of adaptation policies. Moreover, higher levels of 
income within a city may be associated with more demand for better government services. To 
measure the fiscal capacity, I include the per capita median household income of a city.  
Horizontal Diffusion: Climate change policies require understanding of scientific 
information and technical policy tools. Currently adaptation policies at the local level are at their 
nascent stage, and city governments would look to their neighbors to share information and best 
practices. Previous mitigation studies have used a count of the number of city adopters within a 
50mile radius to a place (Krause, 2011). However, given that adaptation policies are ‘rare’, such 
a variable may not capture the intended meaning of neighboring cities. For my study I calculate 




assumption that cities within a state are more likely to have shared networks and resources, and 
utilize them for building climate resilience.  
Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
VARIABLE SMALL CITIES MEDIUM CITIES LARGE CITIES ALL CITIES 
 Mean Std.Dev N Mean Std.Dev N Mean Std.Dev N Mean Std.Dev N 
Level-1: City Characteristics 
Disaster 
Frequency 96.98 85.53 133 98.55 87.94 167 117.93 95.37 161 104.87 90.45 461 
Social 
Vulnerability 
Index 15.18 7.05 136 16.96 5.85 170 18.85 5.81 164 17.11 6.37 470 
Public Opinion 51.85 5.73 136 54.79 4.45 170 53.97 4.84 164 53.66 5.13 470 
Form of Govt. 0.50 0.50 136 0.64 0.48 170 0.49 0.50 164 0.55 0.50 470 
Environmental 
Orgs.  17.99 21.47 109 32.80 37.16 162 31.35 33.20 159 28.51 32.90 430 
Carbon Intensive 
Industry 22.46 11.04 136 19.35 6.65 170 19.59 4.98 164 20.34 7.86 470 
Median Income 56128 30176 136 59705 23735 170 51426 16168 164 55781 23889 470 
Population 10024 6974 136 55371 21548 170 366265 753433 164 150731 472745 470 
Participating 
Neighbors  12.96 14.26 136 19.37 16.53 170 14.34 15.67 164 15.76 15.84 470 
             
Level-2: State Characteristics 
Adaptation 
Policy 0.59 0.49 136 0.76 0.43 170 0.62 0.49 164 0.66 0.47 470 
Govt. Ideology 43.78 35.24 136 54.56 35.68 170 44.59 34.81 164 47.96 35.60 470 
Carbon Industry 19.92 6.94 136 18.15 6.78 170 20.26 6.79 164 19.40 6.88 470 
Total N   136   170   164   470 
NOTE: *Population criteria of small, medium and large cities mimic the broader practice of city stratification used 
by the U.S. Census Bureau.  
Small Cities (Population less than 25,000), Medium Cities (Population between 25,000 and 100,000), and Large 
Cities (Population more than 100,000)  
B. State Variables (Level-2) 
State government factors can be motivators, resources or inhibitors for local policy 
making. In the case of climate adaptation, the state influences are less pronounced with currently 
no mandatory requirements for cities to adapt to climate change. Despite this, state action and 
characteristics can have indirect impacts on city governments. And these forces can be both 
supportive (democratic institutions, state adaptation policies, healthily fiscal capacity) or 




focus on adaptation policy experience, government ideology and presence of carbon intensive 
industry.  
States adaptation policy experience is a dichotomous variable creating by coding 1 if they 
have already created or are in-process of creating an adaptation plan, and 0 if not. This 
information is gathered from the Georgetown Climate Center. For institutional ideology, I rely 
on the measure created by Berry et al. 1998 (updated 2010, and 2015). This indicator is created 
through a combination of measures that represent the “center of gravity” of the state’s elected 
officials on a continuum from liberals to conservatives (pp.3).14  This measure reflects both 
chambers of a state legislature along with ideology of the governor.  
Further, to capture potential oppositional pressure from the industry lobbyists who resist 
policy development on climate change (Dunlap & McCright, 2011). I use the contribution of 
carbon intensive industries to a State’s GDP. This is calculated by aggregating the GDP from the 
mining, utilities, construction and manufacturing sector and presented as percentage to the total 
GDP of a state.  
 
METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
Given the nested nature of the study, I apply a multilevel model for analysis. Multilevel 
models are used when the dependent variable is a function of predictor variables at more than 
one level (Luke, 2004). Multiple cities are embedded within a state creating clusters that are 
subject to the same state-level socio-economic and political influences. Results of the previous 
                                                      
 
14 Berry et al. 1998 – State Institutional Ideology calculated from the weighted average of the ideological 
position of each of five institutional actors - (i) the Democratic delegation in the state house, (ii) the 
Republican delegation in the state house, (iii) the Democratic delegation in the state senate, (iv) the 





chapter (See Chapter 2 on State Politics) indicate that there is considerable variability among 
state behavior across predictors such as EPA regions and government ideologies. These 
variations create state-level patterns that have uneven effects on cities within them.15 
One of the assumptions of the single-level ordinary least square OLS models is that the 
observations and their error terms are independent of one another. However, the nested structure 
of cities within states can lead to a violation of this independence assumption (clustered data 
leading to standard errors smaller than they should be) and a greater likelihood of committing the 
Type-I error. Multilevel models relax this independence assumption by allowing correlated error 
structures resulting in an unbiased estimation (Gelman & Hill, 2007).  
The multilevel model is influenced by both the individual level-1 (cities) and the group 
level-2 (states), where both the intercept and slope vary across level-2 units (Luke, 2004). The 
general equation is: 
𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑋1𝑖𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖𝑖 
where 
𝛽0𝑖 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01𝑍1𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢0𝑖 
𝛽1𝑖 = 𝛾8, 
 
where ‘i' subscript represents individuals, and ‘j’ subscript represents the groups informing us 
that a different level-1 model is estimated for each of the level-2 units (Luke, 2004). Through 
this structure, as desired, the intercept and slope of level-2 are allowed to vary. The intercept 𝛽0𝑖  
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is based on values of the independent variables 𝑍1𝑖𝑖  and error term 𝑢0𝑖  in level-2. I use a random 
intercept logistic multilevel model using the statistical program STATA.  
 
Level-1: Structural Equation 
𝜂 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑑) + 𝛽2(𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑣𝑢𝑠𝑣𝑑𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑎) + 𝛽3(𝑝𝑢𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑠 𝑠𝑝𝑑𝑣𝑑𝑠𝑣)
+ 𝛽4(𝑔𝑠𝑣𝑑.𝑓𝑠𝑟𝑓) + 𝛽5(𝑑𝑣𝑣. 𝑝𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑑) +  𝛽6(𝑠𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑣 𝑑𝑣𝑑𝑢𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑎)
+ 𝛽7(𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣 𝑑𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑑) + 𝛽8(𝑝𝑑𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑑𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑔 𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑔ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑑) 
 
Level-2: Structural Equation 
𝛽0 = 𝛾00 + 𝑢0 
𝛽1 = 𝛾10 
𝛽2 = 𝛾20 
𝛽3 = 𝛾30 
𝛽4 = 𝛾40 
𝛽5 = 𝛾50 
𝛽6 = 𝛾60 
𝛽7 = 𝛾70 
𝛽8 = 𝛾80 
 
My study is a cross-sectional analysis of city action for climate adaptation in 2015. Since 
conditions from a previous year are likely to result in the next year’s outcomes, I lag all my 
independent variables by one year (2014). I develop and test parsimonious models in four 





2.5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Findings at the State Level 
The results show that none of the state level indicators influence local commitment to 
adaptation, and their effects are insignificant even across city types. Based on preceding DOI 
research, I expected state characteristics to either have a ‘snowball’ or ‘pressure-valve’ effect 
(Shipan & Volden, 2006), however my hypothesis are not supported by empirical results. This 
implies that adaptation planning among cities is driven predominantly by local politics and 
currently top-down pressures from the state are not systematically shaping local government 
action one way or another in terms of resiliency planning. One explanation for this can be that 
states’ merely ‘leading by example’ is not enough motivation for city governments to prepare 
plans. State Adaptation Plans provide frameworks and strategies, but do not explicitly require 
action from local governments.  
Previous studies which find a significant impact of state level factors have examined 
policy areas with clear mention for local action (See (Feiock & West, 1993)). Similarly, 
mitigation studies find that where states have not directly encouraged local policy-making, the 
effect of state factors has been insignificant (Krause, 2011). In light of this, my null results build 







Table 2.5: Impact of State & Local Factors on City’s Decision for Adaptation Planning 
 All Cities Small Cities 
Medium 










Level 1 City Variables     
Problem severity     
Disaster Frequency 1.000 0.996 1.000 1.003 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) Vulnerability     
Social Vulnerability 1.073*** 1.109** 1.065* 1.063 
 (0.026) (0.052) (0.044) (0.050) 
Political factors      
Public Opinion 1.045 0.996 1.004 1.121* 
 (0.036) (0.071) (0.058) (0.071) 
Forms of Government 0.453*** 0.385** 0.493* 0.468* 
 (0.106) (0.188) (0.190) (0.189) 
Interest Group Pressure     
Environmental Groups 1.005 1.036** 1.001 1.007 
 (0.004) (0.017) (0.006) (0.007) 
Carbon Intensive 
Industry 0.914*** 0.930*** 0.912*** 0.866*** 
 (0.016) (0.027) (0.028) (0.037) City Capacity     
Median Income 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (5.80E-06) (8.89E-06) (1.03E-05) (1.59E-05) Participating Neighbors 0.991 0.964* 1.000 0.992 
       (0.009) (0.021) (0.015) (0.016) 
Medium Cities 0.597*    
 (0.172)    
Large Cities 0.486**    
 (0.145)    
Level 2 State Variables     
State Adaptation Policy 2.37e-08 7.38e-12 6.61e-11 5.93e-08 
 (0.333) (0.311) (0.255) (0.281) 
Carbon Intensive Industry 1.29e-12 7.42e-13 7.84e-13 3.86e-10 
 (0.011) (0.022) (0.011) (0.010) 
State Ideology 1.39e-10 4.85e-14 7.93e-13 1.61e-10 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
     
N  419 106 157 156 
Log likelihood -256.083 -61.707 -99.308 -87.845 





Findings at the Local Level 
A. Full Model with All Cities 
 The results are mixed at the local level. While social vulnerability, government structure 
and carbon industries matter; other variables are not significant in the full model.16 As expected, 
cities with a larger population of vulnerable communities are more likely to build resilience and 
prepare adaptation plans. Yet the risk from climate change is not significant. Climate adaptation 
by definition means building resilience to the harmful impacts of climate change. Yet most 
empirical studies for mitigation and adaptation do not find extreme weather events significant 
(Krause, 2011; Wang, 2013a; Zahran et al., 2008). While this finding is counterintuitive to my 
hypothesis, the result may be due to the way the variable of problem severity is operationalized. 
These studies, including my own, use past and current weather events and do not include 
measures for expected impacts in the future. Climate science suggests that the main brunt of the 
problem will be experienced in the next 10, 20 or 100 years (IPCC, 2014). Currently there are no 
large-scale local weather indicators that include future projections of climate change available 
for possible inclusion in the study.  
  The cost of adaptation has been identified as a key barrier to action (Biesbroek et al., 
2013). Yet my results do not find fiscal capacity a significant factor in adaptation decision-
making. One possible reason could be that the politics surrounding adaptation drives action more 
than the actual capacity of the local authorities. It may also be that it is costless to declare intent 
to plan for adaptation. For example, the cost involved for mayor to sign the RC4A or Compact of 
Mayors to show their commitment for climate adaptation is relatively low, and fiscal capacity 
would not be as strong a barrier at previously expected for adaptation policy development. This 
                                                      
 




finding is also similar to politics of climate mitigation where fiscal capacity was not an important 
barrier (Krause, 2011). City authorities are more likely to respond to other pressures like 
vulnerabilities and interest group pressures when making their decisions. 
 While the presence of environmental groups does not lead to action, I find that the 
oppositional force from the carbon intensive industry is significant. Industries like the 
manufacturing and utilities that perceive additional cost burdens from any form of climate action 
pose a potential obstacle in the development of policy. Local economies with a higher 
contribution from these firms lead to a decrease in the probability of policy adoption. This 
finding is in line with previous research on urban politics, where local politicians are more 
inclined to prioritize development and industry interests (Feiock et al., 2010; Lubell et al., 2009; 
Stone, 1980).  
 The industry lobby has been a strong and successful oppositional factor for mitigation 
policy adoption (Krause, 2011). These findings have implications for designing policy strategies 
to overcome oppositional pressures. For example, federal and state governments can provide 
financial incentives to industries to help transition from carbon intensive activities to cleaner 
technologies that reduce emissions. Such financial and technological motivations could possibly 
reduce the threats faced by the industry lobbyists, and gain more traction on policies to build 
resilience.  
 Similar to previous studies, my results also show reduced commitment for building 
resilience among cities with mayor-council forms of government (Bae & Feiock, 2013). As 
hypothesized, mayor-council governments are more likely to be affected by the politics 
surrounding the issue, and with climate change being highly contentious; my results show that 




government in the near future, state and federal support for local adaptation planning would need 
to be tailored based on the institutional characteristics at the local level.  
 There is no evidence of horizontal diffusion among the cities. This is an unexpected 
result, especially with mitigation studies showing a strong influence of neighboring cities 
(Krause, 2011). This maybe because climate adaptation policies are still at a nascent stage and 
have lagged in their development in comparison to mitigation, much like the pattern in state 
adaptation. Cities currently planning of adaptation are the leaders on the issue and taking action 
on their own initiative.  
 Last, my results show that population size matters, and small cities are significantly 
different from medium and large cities. Similar to studies on sustainable development (Portney, 
2009), smaller cities lack resources and capacity needed for planning and have different factors 
that influence their decisions on adaptation planning (Lubell et al.,2009). This suggests 
theoretical and empirical evidence for a deeper analysis on city size, which is discussed in the 
section below. 
B. Closer Look at Variation across City Size 
 Models for small, medium and large cities show very interesting results. Results in Table 
2.6 are based on calculating the effect size of different predictors when all variables are held at 
their mean and the variable of interest increases from its mean to one standard deviation above 
mean. This gives the change in likelihood of commitment for building resilience and adaptation. 
The influence of some local level factors is consistent over cities but with differing substantial 
effects, while other factors vary in significance themselves. These differences are most 




Table 2.6: Substantive Effect of Variables on Making Commitments for Climate Adaptation 
Independent Variable Change in Likelihood of Adopting 
All Cities  
All variables held at their means                           0.082** 
Social Vulnerability – (1 std. deviation increase)                           0.533***               
Carbon Intensive Industry - (1 std. deviation increase)                 - 0.687*** 
Govt. Form - (0 to 1)                        - 0.261* 
  
Small Cities (population <25,000)  
All variables held at their means                          0.254 
Social Vulnerability - (1 std. deviation increase)                          1.042** 
Carbon Intensive Industry - (1 std. deviation increase)                       - 0.713* 
Environmental Interest Groups -(1 std. deviation 
increase) 
                        1.006*** 
Participating Neighbors - (1 std. deviation increase)                       - 0.189 
Govt. Form - (0 to 1)                       - 0.169* 
  
Medium Cities(population 25,000 to 100,000)  
All variables held at their means                          0.008 
Social Vulnerability - (1 std. deviation increase)                          0.372 
Carbon Intensive Industry - (1 std. deviation increase)                       - 0.613** 
Govt. Form - (0 to 1)                       - 0.244 
  
Large  Cities(population >100,000)  
All variables held at their means                          0.064 
Public Opinion - (1 std. deviation increase)                          0.593* 
Carbon Intensive Industry - (1 std. deviation increase)                       - 0.665** 
Govt. Form – (0 to 1)                       - 0.321 
 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
Larger cities are most affected by the politics surrounding climate change. This is visible 
through the relatively higher substantive effects of the political factors. When large cities have 
mayor-council governments, they are more likely to reduce commitment for building resilience 
communities. Additionally, larger city governments are highly responsive to the opinion of the 
public while making decisions (public opinion is not statistically significant for small/medium 




of climate risk and community vulnerabilities. My results don’t find problem severity variables 
significant in large cities.   
 Oppositional pressure from interest groups is significant for all three city types. But it’s 
the smaller cities that are most affected by interest group politics. On the one hand small cities 
with greater contribution of the carbon industry are the least likely to adopt policies. On the other 
hand, when the presence of environmental groups is increased, it doubles their likelihood to 
prepare for climate adaptation. Closer examination of the substantive effects of these competing 
interest group pressures reveals that environmental groups are more effective in lobbying for 
climate action than their industrial counterparts. This finding is encouraging for pro-climate 
action, yet is limited to small cities.  
 Lastly, the evidence of horizontal diffusion is only visible for small cities, and is 
negative. Small cities may lack the resources and capacity to prepare for climate adaptation 
(Carter & Culp, 2010) and see action by neighboring cities as an opportunity to free-ride on 
benefits. This finding requires deeper investigation.  
2.6. CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD 
 There are interesting patterns observed in local adaptation planning. First, state level 
characteristics and state policy experience do not have a significant effect on city action. States 
are leading by their own example and planning for resilience, yet these plans currently don’t 
mandate local action or inaction. Previous research analyzing the quality of city plans show that 
most strategies are reactive and constitute low-hanging fruits (Bierbaum et al., 2013). I also find 
that cities are not looking to their neighbors to either compete or share information and are 




proactive and comprehensive local planning, direct encouragement from higher government 
institutions could be necessary. Perhaps more explicit positive incentives such as grants and 
resource sharing or more negative carrot-and-stick approach with enforcement threats or 
penalties maybe required.  
 Second, local level characterizes do effect decisions by city governments. When 
examining cities in general, factors such as social vulnerability, government structure and 
opposing interest groups from the industry matter. Unfortunately, most of these factors are static 
or difficult to change in the short term. Given the influence of social vulnerabilities, it would be 
helpful to continue to conduct sophisticated assessments of the potential risks and coping 
capacities of communities at the local level. A clearer understanding is likely to give 
policymakers important information need for planning.   
 Lastly, planning for adaptation varies by city size. This finding sheds light on an area not 
previously studied in adaptation. Smaller cities respond differently to local factors than larger 
cities. Studies on sustainability policy have indicated that smaller cities lack the capacity and 
resources and have lagged behind in policy development (Portney, 2009). With a better 
indication of the likely factors that support or suppress adaptation planning among small cities, 
this outcome can be different. It is encouraging to see that the presence of environmental groups 
is a strong catalyst in policy development. 
 Larger cities seem to respond to the heated politics of climate change. Over the years we 
have seen a growing support of climate change among the American public (PEW, 2014). This 
trend can help larger cities follow the public opinion and expand action to build resilience. 
Overall, the results are promising and provide a clear indication of the different predictors for 




Way Forward: This chapter is among the few large scale quantitative analyses on local 
adaptation planning. While the results are interesting, these findings necessitate further 
investigation into this contemporary issue. First, the dependent variable can be expanded to 
explore policy adoption and policy intensity or ambitiousness. As investigated in the previous 
chapter on state politics, policy ambitiousness can help distinguish ‘deep’ versus ‘shallow’ 
commitment, and deepen our understanding of the decision making process. Second, the study 
can be expanded from a cross-sectional analysis to panel data spanning over a period of time. 
The longer time horizon will allow for more variation in the variables, as well as increase the 
sample size to give more predictability capacity to the models.  
Third, with the results suggesting interesting patterns among the interest group pressures 
and forms of governments, it would be useful to expand the investigation by testing conditional 
effects from factors. And lastly, there is a need to develop better measures for problem severity 
and impacts that more accurately represent impacts of climate change by incorporating future 
climate scenarios and projections. The impacts of climate change are only expected to increase in 
intensity and frequency. Innovative action by cities is still at its nascent stage, and adaptation 





UNPACKING THE COLLABORATION “BLACK-BOX” – A FRAMEWORK TO 
ANALYZE STATE ADAPTATION PLANS 
“Coming together is a beginning; keeping together is progress; working together is success” 
- Henry Ford 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, the President’s State, Local and Tribal Leaders Task Force on Climate 
Preparedness and Resilience provided a systematic overview of potential impacts of climate 
change in the United States. The report predicts significant adverse impacts from climate change, 
including negative health and economic implications, which are expected to escalate as climate 
change continues. Even with measures to reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GHGs), with the 
current levels of emissions in the atmosphere, the negative consequences of climate change are 
expected to continue in the near future. This requires governments to take adaptation action in 
concurrence with mitigation measures (IPCC 2014). 
Adaptation is an on-going process to reduce the vulnerability to climate change and 
increase the resilience of human, biodiversity and infrastructure capacities. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines adaptation as “adjustment in natural 
or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which 
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (IPCC, 2012; pp.556). Adaptation 
strategies vary across geographic locations and scale, and in types of initiatives. They involve 




different organizations and stakeholders. For example, the state of California is a leader in 
climate adaptation action and recommendations initiatives ranging from integrating climate 
change in land-use planning, providing education and outreach through public communication, 
developing web-based tools to monitor health initiatives, and expanding surface and groundwater 
storage for increased water availability (California Climate Adaptation Strategy, 2009).  
These strategies come at high economic costs. It is anticipated that the North Atlantic 
states would incur cumulative costs exceeding $88 billion by 2100 from sea-level rise and 
coastal flooding; the Midwest will require more than $6 billion in infrastructure investments to 
cope with higher temperatures; and California alone would require more than $4 billion in 
investment every year for the next ten years to maintain its drinking water infrastructure (EOP, 
2014).  
Despite these costs, there is growing evidence showing potential benefits in taking timely 
resilience action. Sparks (2008) finds that implementing coastal zoning restrictions and 
remediation action now can have a net present value of $150 million over 25 years, over taking 
no action. Other studies point to the potential synergies between reducing Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions (GHGs) and adaptation measures, providing opportunities for co-benefits. For 
instance, planting trees can act as carbon capturers and reduce GHGs, while at the same time 
reduce urban heat island effects and exposure to extreme heat, leading to health benefits (Harlan 
& Ruddell, 2011). In light of these benefits and growing impacts from weather related events, 
policymakers are increasingly viewing adaptation as a ‘risk-management’ strategy (GAO, 2009).  
As is common in many areas of environmental policy, and climate change in particular, 
in the United States, subnational governments are leading the charge (Glicksman, 2010; Rabe, 




focus primarily on planning. To date fourteen states have prepared State Adaptation Plans 
(SAPs), and eight others are in the process of writing their plans (See Figure 3.1- U.S. States 
with State Adaptation Plans). In addition to these state-wide initiatives, some states have 
prepared sector-specific plans that incorporate climate change risks and impacts into agency 
activities. For example, North Carolina and South Carolina do not have SAPs, but are revising 
their state wildlife plans to consider long term climate change (Georgetown Climate Center, 
2015).  
 
Source: Institute for Policy & Social Research, The University of Kansas; Data from Georgetown Climate Center. 
The map provides an overview of the number of goals set by states in their State Adaptation Plans (SAPs). States 
with plans =14; In-progress=8; No plan=28 
Figure 3.1: U.S. States with State Adaptation Plans (SAPs) 
Need for Collaboration: The impacts from climate change are diverse, unevenly 
distributed across communities, and in the long term, negative (Eagan & Mullin 2016). These 




different economic sectors, government agencies, and levels of government. Extreme weather 
events, like the North American blizzard of January 2015, affected multiple states spanning the 
Pacific Northwest, Central, and Eastern Regions of the country. This disaster damaged property 
like housing and city infrastructure, disrupted transportation and communication, and left many 
low income communities in dire circumstances. Agencies spanning different levels of 
government and across sectors like emergency preparedness, infrastructure, water and health 
took recovery measures in the aftermath (CNN, 2015).  
Similar to policies designed for sustainable development and cross-cutting environmental 
issues, successful adaptation to adverse impacts stemming from climate change will require a 
high level of collaboration between multiple levels of governments and a range of stakeholders 
(Portney, 2015). This is true not only because the nature of the problem (extreme weather events, 
temperature variations, sea-level rise) can span a broad geography, but also because political 
fragmentation in a federalist system often results in no one agency having autonomy over the 
sectors and strategies that are likely to be part of an effective approach to boosting resilience and 
promoting adaptive capacity. For example, a single agency approach to water quality and supply 
management would overlook important interconnections between areas like agriculture, flood 
control and urban development (Daley, 2013).  
Working with various stakeholders such as the private sector, non-governmental 
organizations, researchers and local community is also an important component to successful 
planning and implementation. Formal and informal networks among stakeholders can be 
developed to focus on conflict resolution, decision making and execution of policy strategies 
(Daley, 2013). Such partnerships have commonly emerged for water management within the 




(Sabatier et al., 2005). Stakeholder involvement in the case of climate adaptation can particularly 
benefit through sharing of knowledge and information on the local context of impacts, as well as 
create public private partnerships for service delivery (DeLeon & Varda, 2009; Sabatier et al., 
2005). 
Among the stakeholders, the representation of the public is emphasized in adaptation 
planning. Public participation or civic engagement in policy decision-making is a basic 
parameter for democratic government systems. Public participation can also have various 
practical benefits. When the community is involved in the planning process, it can result in better 
decisions that are more broadly supported, while also support improving the likelihood of 
successful policy and program implementation (Dietz & Stern, 2008). Engagement of public 
includes various activities such as attending public meetings, presence on community advisory 
board, public notice and comments processes, public hearings, and negotiated rule making 
(Daley, 2013).  
Collaborations can also reduce the chances of maladaptation or negative unintended 
consequences. Cross-agency and stakeholder partnerships help ensure that resilience measures 
taken by one organization do not adversely impact another. Instances of maladaptation are not 
uncommon. Berke et al. (2015) find that various local plans designed to reduce vulnerability to 
climate change for a specific location (hazard mitigation, infrastructure, parks and recreation) 
due to weak identification of overlaps and spillovers across agencies, resulted in an increase in 
physical and social vulnerability to hazards. Land use plans could designate some spaces as 
coastal hazard zones, while a capital improvement plan could allocate funds for infrastructure 
development through roads, water and sewer utility expansion in the same area (Berke et al., 




Van de Meene, 2012; Kirshen et al., 2008). Rise in summer temperatures increase the energy 
demand for cooling equipment usage in residence and commercial buildings. To meet increased 
demand, policymakers may device strategies to augment generation of electricity. This may 
result in higher emissions and decrease air quality; thereby negatively affect the health of the 
local population (Kirshen et al., 2008). 
Purpose of Study: Government agencies and international organizations have long 
recognized that collaboration will be a critical tool to address both climate mitigation and climate 
adaptation. Having diverse stakeholders meaningfully involved in adaptation planning is an 
important factor that can help increase the chances of successfully achieving policy goals (EOP, 
2014; ICLEI, 2007; UNDP, 2005). Despite this, there is very little research aimed at 
understanding the nature of collaborative relationships and the policy tools most frequently used.  
Previous works have largely focused on analyzing the incentives and barriers to planning 
for adaptation, or understanding the substantive outcome of strategies implemented to build 
resilience (Biesbroek et al., 2013; Preston et al., 2011). A few other studies have examined the 
quality of adaptation policy documents using methods of plan quality evaluation (Berke et al., 
2015; Berke & Conroy, 2000; Lyles et al., 2014; Woodruff & Stults, 2016).  
While these studies are necessary, they are not sufficient is describing the quality of 
collaboration. Planning documents are indicative of the commitment of action by government 
authorities. Therefore, exploring the ways collaborative relationships are documented and 
discussed in state and local adaptation plans is important, yet understudied. We know little about 
which sectors and agencies undertake collaboration more frequently, or the nature and tools 
applied within these partnerships. There is a need for deeper investigation within the types of 




To address these pertinent questions, in this chapter I develop a framework for analysis of 
the quality and nature of collaboration within state climate adaptation plans. To do so, I merge 
insights from theories of collaborative governance, public participation, environmental decision 
making and plan quality evaluation. Using the Collaborative-Government-Regimes (CGR) 
Framework as my base structure (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015), I incorporate insights from 
scholarship that explores both public participation and inter-governmental involvement, and 
situate these components within the specific context of climate change.  
Research Question: To better understand the quality of collaborative partnerships in 
adaptation planning, I ask multiple inter-related questions – Which agencies are more likely to 
collaborate with one another to develop and implement strategies for climate adaptation, and do 
we see any patterns among these partnerships? Which stakeholders are involved in building 
climate resilience, and what are the means and tools used for these collaborations? Further, what 
is the importance given to collaboration within adaptation policy documents, and at what stages 
of the policy process are these partnerships most evident?  
The main focus of this chapter is to develop a broad framework of analysis, which I call 
Collaboration-in-Adaptation (CIA) Framework, by embedding these questions into a structure 
that is logically and theoretically sound and applicable to adaptation plans across various levels 
of government. First, I provide an overview of climate adaptation and key characteristics of the 
problem. I then present a conceptual background on collaborative governance, public 
participation, principles for plan quality evaluation, and explain the need for collaboration 
presented in various national and international frameworks. Thereafter I delve into the CGR and 
tailor the framework to my research questions, coding schemes, and outline areas where I merge 




state adaptation plans (Alaska, Florida, Colorado and Massachusetts) and a broad discussion of 
two coding components – sectors involved in collaboration, and diversity of participants in 
collaboration. I end the chapter with a discussion on limitations and the way forward. 
3.2. BACKGROUND ON CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION PLANNING 
Planning for adaptation involves incorporating current and future climate impacts into 
decision making in order to build resilience and cope with the advent of climate change. 
Adaptation planning in the U.S. is still at its nascent stage. Early works examining climate 
change plans find that they dealt overwhelmingly with mitigation measures, and adaptation was 
often merely a section within a larger policy document (Wheeler, 2008). This limited focus on 
resilience and coping initiatives led many scholars to investigate the obstacles to adaptation 
planning. Scholars identify four board hurdles, mainly leadership (within the government or 
interest groups), resources (such as economics and technology), communication and information 
flow (including public participation), and values and beliefs on anthropogenic climate change 
(Ekstrom & Moser, 2014). 
As policymakers gradually overcome these barriers, there has been a recent growth in 
stand-alone adaptation plans among state and local governments. To date fourteen states have 
developed their own SAPs (Georgetown Climate Center, 2015) and over forty four local 
governments have developed adaptation plans (Woodruff & Stults, 2016). State and local plans 
serve as a signal indicating the understanding and commitment of a government to building 




involvement of different stakeholders, commitment of resources, and types of goals set, all 
suggest the desire for action and the potential success of initiatives (Wheeler, 2008). 17  
As is commonly the case with subnational environmental policy, there are no standard 
approaches to climate adaptation planning, and documents vary widely on length, number of 
goals, timeframe for action, and tools and mechanisms applied. For example Chicago, Illinois 
has multimillion dollar undertakings spread over a long time horizon, while Houston-Galveston, 
Texas the plan is significantly less intensive and broad. Cities like New York draw heavily on 
creating scientific teams to predict local climate impacts while others such as Keene, New 
Hampshire mainly downscale national or regional projections to assess local climate impacts 
(Poyar & Beller-Simms, 2010). This variation among plans is also visible between state 
governments. Florida has set only 28 goals that mainly focus on planning and capacity building, 
while states like Massachusetts and California have 373 and 345 goals respectively, and go 
beyond capacity building to include post-implementation and monitoring strategies (Georgetown 
Climate Center, 2015).  
In general, these different approaches of plans have broadly been categorized into three 
groups. The first group is comprehensive adaptation plans, in which cities or states prepare cross-
cutting strategies based on climate impact assessments and vulnerabilities. The nature of this 
method is more inclusive of different stakeholders and public participation, and is less likely to 
result in maladaptation (Adger et al., 2005). The second set of strategies involves integrating 
climate change into existing practices, without a separate planning process. This is often 
                                                      
 
17 An adaptation plan can only be successful if implemented. I acknowledge that symbolic politics could be at play, 
especially with climate change being a highly contentious issue. But at a minimum, a well-developed plan indicates 
that the public sector has deliberated on and invested resources for developing a plan, indicating a desire to move 




understood as “mainstreaming” climate adaptation. This group of strategies has potential 
advantages like bypassing the long planning procedure and directly incorporating adaptation into 
government processes (Berke et al., 2012; Preston et al., 2011). However these strategies run the 
risk of maladaptation if the approach is not closely aligned with community values and norms. 
The third set of strategies are “no regrets” and co-benefits. These are actions that have 
beneficial effects even if climate change impacts do not occur, or are indirect benefits of other 
policies such as those for climate mitigation (Hamin, 2012). While an adaptation plan can have a 
combination of all three groups, researchers and experts continue to point to the first category or 
comprehensive adaptation planning being most effective in addressing long term climate change 
(Hamin, 2012). This assessment is predicated on identifying successful adaptation policies. 
Adger et al. (2005) define successful adaptation strategies or decisions as dependent on “how 
that action meets the objectives of adaptation, and how it affects the ability of others to meet 
their adaptation goals” (pp.78). 
Planning for adaptation would need to accommodate some level of uncertainty and allow 
for strategies to be flexible with changing circumstances (Adger et al., 2005). Scientific evidence 
on current and projected climate impacts and its consequences on infrastructure and communities 
(through vulnerability assessments) are necessary for baseline information in plan preparation. 
Over the past few decades, models to predict climate risks have been evolving to better capture 
complexities of the real world. These complexities arise from the interconnectedness of natural 
phenomenon, such as ocean currents, air and water cycles, and clouds, wind and weather 
patterns. Scientific models for climate change are built on many assumptions of these patterns, 




strategies that take some degree of uncertainty into account. Failing to address uncertainty could 
make implementation of proposed strategies less effective.18 
Previous Research: Studies evaluating adaptation plans have primarily focused on case 
study analysis among municipalities and local governments. Preston et al., (2011) examines 57 
plans from Australia, the UK and US, and compare inputs required to achieve program goals 
against the actual outputs, and find that adaptation plans are largely underdeveloped (evaluation 
scores between 16% to 61%, and average of 37%). The documents did not holistically consider 
factors beyond climate (e.g. social and economic vulnerabilities), lacked commitment of various 
capital resources needed, and were biased towards capacity building programs which are lower 
risk strategies as compared to specific actions to reduce vulnerability (Preston et al., 2011). The 
study utilized a Logic Framework Analysis (LFA) which is helpful in evaluating program goals, 
but provides limited guidance for assessing public participation and inter-organizational 
coordination, both of which are critical components needed to develop and implement climate 
adaption programs.  
Other more inclusive studies scan material submitted by federal, tribal, state, and local 
government officials, and the private sector for the U.S. National Climate Assessment. This 
includes documents like Executive Orders, research plans, planning documents and grey 
literature (Bierbaum et al., 2013). While expansive in the scope of material analyzed, they assess 
the breadth of adaptation strategies and barriers to resilience planning, but do not examine the 
quality of critical factors, such as stakeholder involvement and broad collaboration. Other studies 
have devised plan evaluation criteria from adaptation literature and focused on factors such as 
                                                      
 
18 A common approach to incorporate uncertainty in plans is using a ‘scenario planning exercise’ whereby climate 




economic efficiency of initiatives, equity of program costs and benefits, robustness through 
incorporating uncertainty, and potential for mitigation co-benefits (Poyar, 2010). Yet again, this 
research pays scant attention to collaboration.  
To date, the most comprehensive evaluation of adaptation planning in the U.S. is by 
Woodruff & Stults (2016) who analyze 44 city and local government plans using the principles 
of plan quality evaluation (see Section 3.3.C on Evaluating the Quality of Plans, below). They 
score plans on qualities such as clarity in articulation of goals, degree of public participation, 
involvement of other stakeholders, implementation and monitoring. Results suggest that local 
governments have failed to prioritize strategies, and lack details on implementation processes 
(Woodruff & Stults, 2016). While the study’s findings are notable, there is a need for expanding 
our understanding on public participation and collaboration. For example, in their coding scheme 
the authors identify coordination between different stakeholders such as the nonprofits, 
businesses, and local universities, but do not evaluate the type of collaborative goals set, tools 
and mechanisms applied, or which stakeholders and government agencies most frequently 
developed partnerships. My research builds on this work by creating a framework to better 
analyze these aspects, and in an understudied area of state adaptation plans.  
3.3. COLLABORATION & CLIMATE CHANGE– A CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
In this section I provide a conceptual understanding of collaborative governance, public 
participation, and plan quality evaluation within adaptation planning. 
 A. COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE: Emerson & Nabatchi (2015) define 
collaborative governance “as the processes and structures of public policy decision making and 




and/or the public, private, and civic spheres to carry out a public purpose that could not 
otherwise be accomplished” (pp.18). The basic premise for collaborative governance is to bring 
together multiple stakeholders, across varying levels of government and agencies, to address 
complex problems that have high levels of uncertainty, and cannot be effectively tackled by 
traditional policy tools (Agranoff, 2003; Lubell, 2003; Niles & Lubell, 2012; Sabatier et al., 
2005). Collaboration can occur in the vertical direction between levels of government in the U.S. 
federalist system, or horizontally across government agencies, the private sector, community and 
other stakeholders (Agranoff, 2006). 
 Collaborative governance has become more prominent with the emergence of more 
cross-cutting and global issues (like climate change), and growth in technology that allow 
connections across geographic distances. Calls for collaboration tend to increase when the 
problem at hand is ambitious or complex. This is especially true when the issues are salient 
(Sabatier et al., 2005) and difficult to resolve. The so called ‘wicked problems’ or those that are 
not easily solved by single agency and require multiple agencies working together, are more 
likely to result in collaborative governance (Lubell, 2003; McGuire, 2006).  
 Climate change falls well within the definition of a ‘wicked’ problem. In the US, where 
fragmented authority is the norm, enhancing climate resilience will require widespread 
collaboration that is multi-sector, interagency, public-private, and include meaningful public 
participation mechanisms. With the rise in complexity of problems, non-governmental actors 
have also become an increasingly important component in policy implementation. Different non-
governmental actors such as the private sector, not-for-profit organizations and even community 




cannot do’ (Agranoff, 2003). An example of this is the public-private-partnerships developed to 
improve the likelihood of efficient service delivery for public programs (O'Leary & Vij, 2012).  
Various international and national frameworks for adaptation stress the need for 
collaboration to effectively address climate impacts (EOP, 2014; UNCP, 2005). Such 
partnerships and engagement of stakeholders are needed from the outset in the planning and 
decision making stage, and should be detailed within adaptation policies and strategies (EOP, 
2014). These collaborations are fairly under-tested in adaptation and resilience planning among 
state governments.  
B. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: The discussion on collaboration is incomplete without 
delving deeper into the issue of public participation and the involvement of different 
stakeholders.  
Normatively, democratic governance encourages the representation of opinions and needs 
of a diverse set of participants in policy decision-making (DeLeon & Varda, 2009). Public 
participation within collaboration is predicted to result in better evaluation of competing 
demands, and achievement of democratic ideals (Daley, 2013). Broad stakeholder involvement 
in planning for adaption, while time consuming, may increase the chances of successful 
implementation because local knowledge of the problem and local norms are brought to bear in 
the planning process (Daley, 2013). Scholars emphasize that both major and minor interests on 
the policy issue should be represented within public participation (Innes & Booher, 2003).  
Studies have also shown that when stakeholders are involved in the policy process from 
the planning to implementation stage, there is better buy-in from community, reduced conflict, 
and greater success of achieving policy goals (Prell, 2003). In the context of climate change, 




when participatory processes are strengthened, it leads to higher success of adaptation planning. 
There are many similar definitions of public participation in literature. For this chapter, I apply 
Dietz & Stern (2008)’s holistic description that defines public participation as “organized 
processes adopted by elected officials, government agencies, or other public-or-private sector 
organizations to engage the public in [environmental] assessment, planning, decision making, 
management, monitoring, and evaluation” (pp.11). 
For this broad definition, ‘public’ within public participation are not merely individuals 
or their collective interest through groups, but also includes a wide range of participants who 
may be identified as interested or affected persons within the policy issue. It includes those who 
effect and those who are affected by policy choices (DeLeon & Varda, 2009). Participants are 
context specific, and depending on the issue, actors may vary on involvement and degree or 
participation (Renn & Walker, 2008). In the context of climate change, there might be a slight 
variation among stakeholders for mitigation and those for adaptation. For example, with the 
primary goal of mitigation being a reduction in GHG emissions, carbon intensive industries like 
the manufacturing sector would likely be among the key stakeholders. The presence of these 
industry lobbyists might be relatively lower for the case of adaptation, where more focus could 
be placed on vulnerable communities and weather-dependent sectors like agriculture and 
insurance.  
Collaborative public participation does not necessarily ensure effective policy outcomes 
and steps must be taken for meaningful involvement. Historically, low income and minority 
communities have had relatively less access and influence in environmental decision-making 
processes, as compared to well-educated and wealthy individuals (Dietz et al., 2008; Daley, 




reviews with checklists for diversity of stakeholders, and include measures to capture the degree 
of access, especially of the vulnerable communities.  
 Debates within public participation literature have identified potential measures that 
would increase the likelihood of success. An influential work by the National Research Council 
points to five key dimensions of good public participation, mainly who is involved with 
participants selected based on the context of the problem; at what points of the policy process 
they are involved to allow sharing of opinion throughout the policy cycle; intensity of 
stakeholder involvement with efforts to enhance and maintain partnerships; the extent of power 
or influence of different actors; and clear goals for collaboration (Dietz & Stern, 2008; pp. 14). I 
will employ these key dimensions of public participation within my framework for evaluation.   
C. EVALUATING THE QUALITY OF PLANS: In general, research has 
demonstrated that higher quality plans are more likely to results in successful implementation 
and addressing the policy problem (Lyles & Stevens, 2014). To ensure a rigorous process for 
planning is undertaken, there is a growth in standards and principles of the evaluation of plan 
quality.  
Criteria for ‘plan quality evaluation’ have existed in the field of public administration for 
over 5 decades. Early works in the 1970s by Gruft & Gutstein (1972) developed a set of criteria 
for empirical evaluations based on clear rational processes, democratic participation and 
representation of all stakeholders in planning. These measures were extended by Baer (1997) 
who created a general plan evaluation framework with over 60 criteria that analyzed the goals, 
procedural consistency (involvement of multi-governments, stakeholders), implementation and 
feedback. This framework has been applied and tested by many scholars and has been a base 




More recent works by Berke & Godschalk (2009) conducted a thorough analysis of 
prominent plan quality studies across various policy domains and compared existing indexes 
within literature. This thorough investigation resulted in a structure with six principles for plan 
evaluation, which are considered ‘standard’ principles and applied extensively in literature 
(Lyles & Stevens, 2014). These are 1) Goals and breadth of vision 2) Fact base empirical 
foundations (e.g. climate impact and vulnerability assessments) 3) Actions to achieve goals 4) 
Implementation and monitoring details 5) Inter-organizational coordination, and 6) Participation. 
The first four principles are grouped as internal dimensions of plan evaluation, and focus on the 
content and format of the plan. The last two principles are grouped into external dimensions 
(principle 5-6) and assess how the plan fits within the local context and influences (Berke et al., 
2012), and are most relevant to my research question.  
These criteria for plan quality have been applied to diverse policy areas, including 
environmental policy making. Scholars have tested land use and building code rules (Nelson and 
French 2002), mitigation strategies among local governments (Dalton and Burby 1994), and 
zoning regulations among cities (Norton 2008), to name a few. While the majority of these 
studies are at the city and local level, the application of this framework to state level analysis is 
still limited (Lyles & Stevens, 2014).  
It is also pertinent to expand existing inter-organizational scorecards to go beyond 
identification of participants, to deeper investigation of the nature of these relationships such as 
the goal for which these partnerships were established, the stage of participation in the policy 
process, the time frame of partnership, and the tools and mechanisms applied to achieve 




3.4. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 
In the previous section I have provided a brief overview of the background and key 
concepts on collaboration, public participation and climate adaptation planning. In this segment I 
will discuss the framework for analysis of coordination in adaptation planning. This framework 
is a variation of the “Collaborative Governance Regimes” (CGR) proposed by Emerson & 
Nabatchi (2015), and incorporates elements of concepts from public participation and plan 
quality evaluation; and tailors these to policy domain of adaptation planning (See Figure 3.2). I 
will first explain the CGR framework, and then discuss how I operationalize each of the 
framework pieces of fit the chapter’s research question. 
 Emerson & Nabatchi (2015) have undertaken extensive research on collaborative 
governance, combining relevant work by various scholars to integrate different pieces of 
collaborative governance. They call this framework the “Collaborative Governance Regime” 
(CGR). This framework was first presented in 2012, and after incorporating feedback from 
practitioners and researchers, a revised framework was presented in 2015. My chapter is a 





Figure 3.2: The Collaborative Governance Regime (CGR) Framework by Emerson & Nabatchi 
(2015) 
The Integrative framework for collaborative governance (refer Figure 3.2) depicts set of 
nested elements that work together in a “dynamic, nonlinear, iterative fashion” (pp.26). CGR 
framework is broad and can be applied to various policy contexts. The pieces of the framework 
provide a structure with general concepts to understand collaboration and working across 
boundaries. However, the structure of CGR lacks elements of agency or a description of the 
actors and participants. This is where the merging in public participation and plan evaluation 
principles enhances our understanding of collaboration. I modify CGR by integrating stakeholder 
participation, inter-organizational coordination, and concepts specific to climate adaptation 
planning (e.g. maladaptation). I name this the Collaboration-In-Adaptation (CIA) Framework. 
Table 3.1 outlines the details of the CIA framework and serves as a coding guideline.  
 
System context 
Collaborative governance regime 
 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The CGR Framework can be divided into five broad components – i) the system context 
and drivers, ii) collaborative dynamics, iii) collaborative action, iv) outcomes, and v) adaptation. 
Each of these components have sub-parts, and are explained below.  
I. SYSTEM CONTEXT AND DRIVERS: The system context is the broad external 
circumstances which provide a background within which collaboration may emerge. These 
include socioeconomic, political and environmental characteristics surrounding an issue, and can 
create motivations or constraints on how and what types of collaborations might emerge. The 
system context gives rise to four drivers that are a catalyst for cross-boundary collaboration. 
These drivers are - uncertainty, interdependence, consequential incentives and initiating 
leadership. Drivers for collaboration can present themselves in varying degrees and work in 
combinations among themselves to reinforce different patterns of participation and partnerships.  
a. Uncertainty: captures the challenge of problems where the policy solutions are not 
clearly available or are disputed. Such ‘wicked problems’ are surrounded with ambiguity on the 
causes of the problem, limited information and resources, and have a high degree of uncertainty. 
Such situations may drive organizations to work together to decrease risk and result in the 
formation of partnerships (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).  
Literature on collaboration discusses that collaboration is more likely to emerge when the 
problem is more severe or salient (Sabatier et al., 2005), leading to more willingness on the part 
of governments to come together with other agencies and actors. The public participation studies 
mention tailoring the participants to the ‘context’ of the problem (Dietz & Stern, 2008). Another 
way of exploring the context is by understanding the definition of the policy problem, and how 




heterogeneity of climate impacts across boundaries requiring collaboration, or are impacts and 
risks discussed within specific sector boundaries. Combining these ideas I ask: 
 
Question1: Do the descriptions of climate change impacts in the plans mention the need 
for collaboration for successful adaptation?  
 
b. Interdependence: For effective implementation, strategies for adaptation may overlap 
across agency boundaries. Interdependence is described as the mutual reliance of organizations 
and individuals to achieve a goal they cannot accomplish on their own (Emerson & Nabatchi, 
2015). With the rise in complexity of problems, governments are more likely to partner with 
other agencies, private sector and organizations to ‘do what they alone cannot do’ (Agranoff, 
2003).  
For this driver, I mainly focus on cross-sectoral collaboration. I examine collaboration 
cross other stakeholders in another component of the framework (Actions). Within climate 
adaptation, various international and national frameworks recommend inter-organizational 
collaboration (EOP, 2014; UNDP, 2005), but do not point to any groups or pairs of agency 
sectors that maybe more likely to work together. We know little about patterns or trends in 
sectors working together to build resilience.  
 
Question2: Which agency sectors are more likely to collaborate and work with one 





c. Consequential Incentives: Incentives can be the motivation to collaborate. These can 
be in the form of internal pressures within an organization such as resource needs, interests, 
opportunities, or external pressures such as situational crisis, threats and opportunities that are 
better addressed by working with other groups (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). These incentives 
can also be closely connected with the goal or purpose of the partnership – what are the reasons 
for the groups to work together, what they hope to achieve.  
The public participation theory recommends that when government agencies employ 
public participation, they should do so with clarity of goal or objective (Dietz & Stern, 2008). 
Groups may come together to share resources, gain co-benefits, or provide joint services to the 
public. Transparency of objectives for collaboration can be beneficial for successful 
implementation and monitoring of strategies.  
 
Question3: What are the reasons or goals for coming together in collaboration? Is there 
clarity of purpose of collaboration? 
 
d. Initiating Leadership: The CGR framework focuses on a type of leadership –
‘initiating leadership’ as an important and often essential driver for collaborative partnerships. 
This leadership plays a role in bringing the players together, as well as serves to control and 
maintain collaborations in the long run (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). While these characteristics 
are essential, they are not always apparent in planning documents.  
For this reason, I tailor leadership to include a broader description of the values and 
opinions of the policymakers of the adaptation plan. Policymakers or leaders within the 




of ways the problem and solutions are discussed (Preston et al., 2009). I assess this in three ways 
– whether there is a lead entity overseeing collaboration, whether collaboration is framed as 
necessary and essential, and the importance given to collaboration within the actual plan 
document. 
 
Question4a: Is there a leader to oversee the collaborative efforts? Is there description of 
the distribution of power among the collaborating parties? 
 
Question4b: How do the policymakers frame collaboration within the plans?  
 
Question4c: What is the importance given to collaboration within the larger context of 
the adaptation plan? 
 
 II. COLLABORATION DYNAMICS: The process of collaboration can be discussed in 
a linear fashion with a sequence of steps that are commonly discussed in traditional public policy 
theories. But similar to contemporary policy theories that propose more dynamic depiction of the 
real world, the CGR’s collaborative dynamics is circular and iterative. This piece of the 
framework focuses more on the process side of governance, and describes how participants in 
collaboration develop shared goals and strategies over the long term (Emerson & Nabatchi, 
2015).  
 Collaborative dynamics have three components – principled engagement, shared 





 a. Principled Engagement: ‘principled’ of the term principled engagement refers to the 
underlying assumption on which the participants engage in collaboration. It can be understood as 
how actors with different opinions, values and experiences unite around a shared understanding. 
This includes discovery (sharing concerns, values, information), definition (shared meaning and 
understanding of the problem and its solutions), deliberation (meaningful discussion to reach 
consensus), and determinations (reaching a joint conclusion) (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).  
 While each of the parts for principled engagement has merit for in-depth analysis, clear 
distinction of these may not be apparent in a planning document. For this reason, I combine these 
measures and focus on principled engagement as a common understanding on the problem and 
solutions among participants. This criterion however overlaps with the operationalization of 
‘uncertainty’, and I do not code separately for the same (same as Research Question 1).  
 b. Shared Motivation: describes the interpersonal relationships between participants, 
which is measured in terms of trust, mutual understanding, internal legitimacy, and commitment 
(Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Given the nature of this study, evaluating levels of trust is not 
feasible through planning documents. Instead, I focus on the broader concepts of a shared 
understanding between stakeholders. This concept overlaps with ‘Consequential Incentives’ 
which measures the purpose or reasons for collaboration. No new code is created to measure 
shared motivation (same as Research Question 3). 
c. Capacity for Joint Action: is the functional aspect of the framework which describes 
the formal and informal institutional arrangements, protocols, and ways resources and 
knowledge will be shared among participants (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). These arrangements 




 Scholars within the field of public participation recommend transparency of these 
processes (Dietz & Stern, 2008) as an important principle for equity and legitimacy. The 
procedural and institutional elements have also been mentioned within discourses on policy 
instrument selection. It is important to have clarity on the means and ways participants envision 
collaboration will be achieved through the duration of partnership. I operationalize this ‘capacity 
for joint action’ through tools and mechanisms through which collaboration is achieved. These 
include, and are not limited to, sharing knowledge, human resources, infrastructure facilities, or 
technology equipment, and creating regulatory arrangements, or rules for leadership and 
communication (Henstra, 2015).   
 
Question 5: What tools and mechanisms are used to collaborate? 
 
III. ACTIONS: Through the iterative interactions between the components of 
collaborative dynamics mentioned above, participants prioritize and select activities through 
which they plan to achieve their goals set within the partnership agreements. They are ‘means to 
an end’ to accomplish what the stakeholders mutually agreed upon (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).  
Collaborative action may take different forms, depending on the context of the policy 
domain and the decisions reached among the participants. For example, action could be based on 
functional criteria such as capacity building or resource generation (Agranoff, 2003). The 
components of ‘Capacity for Joint Action’ and ‘Actions’ are closely related but not identical. 
Capacity-for-Joint-Action is the means through which action strategies will be implemented and 
achieved. As the name suggests, ‘capacity’ points to the ability and ways stakeholders plan to 




In the context of climate change, actions could be broad like building resilience, reducing 
GHG emissions; or more specific like establishing a Clearinghouse to gather and distribute 
climate information, create Task Forces and new institutions to investigate climate impacts, and 
policy advocacy for raising funds (EOP, 2014). Since the range of initiatives is expected to vary 
widely across plans, I use a more open ended code to distinguish between broad and specific 
measures. I also examine the length and duration of these collaborative actions.  
 
Question 6a: What types of actions are taken to achieve collaboration goals? 
 
Question 6b: What is the timeframe for collaborative action? Is there discussion for 
long-term partnerships? 
 
IV. PARTICIPATION: CGR as a framework provides a practical structure to assess the 
different moving parts within collaborative governance. While this is useful and I apply the 
components in my Analysis-Framework, the structure is limited in capturing the agency or types 
of actors within the system. For example, the aspect of leadership is discussed as one of the four 
drivers for collaboration, but there is inadequate understanding on which actors take on 
leadership. Similarly, while we know about the actions implemented in collaboration, we know 
little about the actual participants in these teams.  
It is here that the standards for Public Participation and principles for Plan Quality 
Evaluation are helpful to highlight the types and diversity of actors. As discussed in the theory 
section of this chapter, public participation should be incorporated in policy decision-making to 




effectiveness of policy implementation (practical aspects) (Dietz & Stern, 2008). My CIA 
Framework has integrated various recommended standards of public participation from literature 
into different components of the CGR framework. These include diagnosis of the context of the 
policy problem within ‘Uncertainty’; clarity of purpose within ‘Consequential Incentives’; and 
transparency of process within ‘Capacity for Joint Action’. In this component on ‘Participation’ I 
bring in standards of who should be involved in collaborative governance.  
The U.S. National Research Council recommends involvement of public to include the 
key stakeholders (organized groups affected by the policy decision), the affected public 
(expected to experience positive/negative effects from outcome or policy problem), the 
observing public (media, opinion leaders), and the general public (not directly affected or part of 
public opinion) (Dietz & Stern, 2008; pp.15). I operationalize this recommendation to test for 
each of the above groups and code for the private sector such as the manufacturing industry and 
insurance companies (stakeholders), the vulnerable communities as identified through climate 
assessments (affected public), researchers and academia (observing public) and the local 
community (general public).  
However climate adaptation policies necessitate the involvement of different stakeholders 
as well as inter-agency and cross-boundary partnerships in a federalist system (EOP, 2014). The 
Plan Quality Evaluation Principle-5 aims to capture just that. The standards for Inter-
Organizational Coordination help explore government authorities’ working across jurisdictional 
borders, either through vertical partnerships such as between federal, state and local authorities, 
or creating horizontal ties between agencies across sectors on the same level of government. In 
addition to these recommendations, I also code for partnerships with the tribal governments, and 




Public participation theories also highlight involving stakeholders at all stages of 
decision-making (Dietz & Stern, 2008) and I test the came with respect to stages of the policy 
cycle that result in collaborations among the different actors.    
 
Question 7a: Who is involved in the action? 
 
Question 7b: What stage of planning is the action taken in? 
 
 V. OUTCOMES: The purpose of collaboration is the intended goal or outcome the 
participants aim to achieve. These are objectives that different actors come together on, and 
decide through thorough deliberation and representation (as discussed above). These intended 
benefits can be viewed as the yardstick against which policymakers and stakeholders design and 
implement strategies (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Since the intent and operationalization of this 
component overlaps with ‘Consequential Incentives’, I do not create separate codes for 
Outcomes (Same as Research Question 3). 
VI. MALADAPTATION: Incoherence among policy instruments can result in 
unintended negative impacts on different sectors or groups of people (Henstra, 2015). 
Maladaptation can result from the spill-over of initiatives implemented within water-tight agency 
jurisdictions that do not consider broader implications of the activities. Scholars have 
documented various case studies where well-intended government policies resulted in 
maladaptation (Adger et al., 2005). In order to cater for this, I have created a code that will 
explore if the plan document mentions or discusses potential maladaptation of policy goals, as 




 Question 8: Is there recognition of potential maladaptation? Are there strategies to 
prevent maladaptation? 
3.5. APPLICATION OF FRAMEWORK – PRELIMINARY TEST 
 My Collaboration-In-Adaptation (CIA) Framework has many components that can be 
tested on various adaptation plans at different levels of government. While the main purpose of 
this chapter is to develop the framework, I conduct a preliminary test to assess how well the 
codes developed can be applied to the planning documents. The purpose of this application is not 
to propose any definitive results, and the findings are presented as a mere indication of emerging 
patterns. I also present examples to illustrate how the codes perform in practice. 
 METHOD: I apply the CIA to four State Adaptation Plans. These states are purposefully 
selected to provide a variation on geographic locations as well as the number of goals set. As 
mentioned earlier, the goals set by the states are an indication of the level of commitment by 
policymakers to tackle the problem (Georgetown Climate Center, 2015). I divide the goals into 
four categories – states with less than 50 goals, states with 50 to 100 goals, 100 to 200 goals, and 
finally those with more than 200 (See Figure 3.1, which describes State with adaptation policies). 
From these groups I make my selection of states from the Eastern, Central, and Western Regions. 
The sample includes Florida, Colorado, Alaska and Massachusetts (See Table 3.2 for details).  
  
Table 3.2: Sample of States Selected for Preliminary Test of CIA Framework 
State Goals  Location 
Florida 28 (Less than 50) South-East 
Colorado 72 (Between 50 to 100) Central  
Alaska 158 (Between 100 to 200) West + High Tribal Population 




I take the adaptation planning document for each of these states and apply the CIA 
framework. The coding strategy applied is a free sentence coding approach where quotations or 
paragraphs of text are selected based on their relevance in discussing collaboration within the 
framework’s concepts (Krippendorff 2004). This process applies codes to a paragraphs or parts 
of a paragraph for the four documents. It must be noted that a single quotation of text can be 
given multiple codes. I use Atlas.ti (version 7) qualitative analysis software to code and analyze 
my findings.  
 
RESULTS: The framework has many broad concepts that can each be investigated in-
depth. However, for the purpose of this preliminary test I present results and examples on two 
main questions – which sectors are more likely to collaborate, and which participants are more 
involved in the collaboration.  
A.  Interdependence (Inter-Agency Collaboration): To assess which sectors are more 
likely to collaborate with one another, I aggregate the codes of each sector that appear together 
within a quotation. For example: 
“Another important set of cross-cutting strategies identified during the development of 
this report include measures that preserve, protect, and restore natural habitats and the 
hydrology of watersheds. These strategies not only benefit natural resources and habitat, 
but can also play a critical role in protecting and increasing resilience of key 
infrastructure sectors, human health, and the local economy.” (Massachusetts Climate 
Change Adaptation Report, 2011; pp.3) 
 
This quotation was given sector codes for biodiversity, infrastructure, health and others 
(‘others’ representing local economy). Another example to explain the coding procedure: 
“Water quality and water quantity are inextricably connected; both are vital for 
Colorado’s future. Managing both conjunctively is important for the continuation of the 
state’s healthy environment, diverse economy, and quality of life. It is not sufficient just 




ways Coloradans use it, from drinking and wildlife protection to agriculture and 
recreation. This is especially true given climate projections that include potential water 
quality impacts on Colorado’s water supply.” (Colorado Climate Preparedness Project, 
2011; pp.11)  
 
This text was given sector codes for water, biodiversity, agriculture and other (for 
recreation/tourism). The results of this coding procedure for all four adaptation plans are 
summarized in Table 3.3 below.  






























































Agriculture 0 7 0 0 0 2 4 13 10 4 40 
Biodiversity 7 0 6 4 2 11 14 14 11 15 84 
Coasts 0 6 0 0 0 4 4 3 1 4 22 
Forestry 0 4 0 0 0 1 2 1 4 2 14 
Emergency 0 2 0 0 0 6 2 4 2 1 17 
Health 2 11 4 1 6 0 16 5 7 21 73 
Infrastructure 4 14 4 2 2 16 0 12 10 18 82 
Water 13 14 3 1 4 5 12 0 9 8 69 
Others 10 11 1 4 2 7 10 9 0 15 69 
Mitigation 4 15 4 2 1 21 18 8 15 0 88 
Note: Tables results presented for 4 States: Alaska, Florida, Colorado and Massachusetts, using Atlas.ti 
The table provides an overview discussion within the planning documents that discussed 
collaboration and cut across agency boundaries. The numbers represent the frequency of mention 
across the plans, with those in bold highlight the highest rate of recurrence. I find that co-benefits 
of mitigation strategies with positive spill-over in the health, infrastructure, and biodiversity 
sector appear the most frequently among plans. This could be an indication that policymakers 




preliminary findings are in line with previous research on adaptation plan evaluation that suggest 
prominence of low-risk and co-benefit strategies (Woodruf & Stults, 2016; Bierbaum et al, 2013; 
Preston et al., 2011; Poyar, 2010). In terms of interagency collaboration, I find the health and 
infrastructure sectors most prominent, followed closely by partnerships between the agriculture 
and water sector. 
 
B. Participation (Collaboration Participants): This code identifies the diversity of 
stakeholders and actors involved in the collaborative arrangement. For example, the quotation 
below received stakeholder codes for the federal government, local government, academia and 
community: 
“Create/designate an Immediate Action Work Group (IAWG)-like entity to assume a 
coordinating role now. We recommend this group be permanent and be action-oriented, 
focusing on aligning and coordinating (not regulating) decisions. Impacted and 
potentially impacted communities, agency funders, and researchers frequently do not 
know about each other’s planning efforts, infrastructure improvement projects, or 
funding opportunities. The proposed entity is needed to coordinate communication 
horizontally among partner agencies and vertically among levels of government and 
other stakeholders. It will streamline processes, eliminate duplicate efforts, minimize 
unnecessary effort, and minimize transaction costs of developing and carrying out a 
statewide system. A State of Alaska Executive Order is likely needed to establish this 
entity or structure. A senior-level executive should be manager. Implementation will be 
through existing agencies and authorities.” (Alaska’s Climate Change Strategy, 2010; 
pp.4-9) 
 
Another example on stakeholders received codes academia (which includes researchers 
and experts) and the state government agency.  
“Planning for climate change in Colorado is particularly challenging because the 
projections of future conditions range significantly. To better understand the potential 
risks and challenges, Denver Water directly engages with climate scientists to “co-
produce” the data, tools, and methods needed to incorporate climate change into their 
planning. These collaborations keep Denver Water at the forefront of climate science 
while providing critical feedback and encouraging climate scientists to better meet 





Table 3.4: Preliminary Results – Frequency of Collaborations Among Different Stakeholders for 
Four Sample States 
STAKEHOLDER COLLABORATIONS 











Note: Tables results presented for 4 States: Alaska, Florida, Colorado and 
Massachusetts, using Atlas.ti 
 Table 3.4 presents the different collaborative participants with state government agencies. 
As expected, these preliminary finding suggest potentially strong ties among state and local 
governments in implementing adaptation strategies. State governments also seem to consult and 
partner with the federal government implying a likelihood of healthy vertical collaboration 
across different levels of government.  
 Among non-governmental stakeholders, the private sector seems to be the most 
frequently involved, and at a relatively higher rate than the local community. A further 
investigation into the goals for collaboration, types of tools and mechanism applied, and the 
policy stages of involvement would better explain the differences in quality of collaborations 
between the private sector and local community. Such insights would build on public 




3.6. CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD 
Collaboration is necessary for successful adaptation planning. Climate change is a 
‘wicked’ problem, involving complex scientific and technical knowledge, as well as high levels 
of complexity. Impacts of extreme weather events, sea level rise, and changing temperatures 
resulting from climate change are spread across geographic boundaries that are beyond typical 
judicial and political borders. Effective policy measures and strategies would need to cross 
government agencies, and involve various stakeholders and organizations.  
While international and national frameworks on adaptation continue to stress the need for 
collaboration and coordination, there is limited analysis on whether these standards are actually 
applied within existing plans. Previous studied on adaptation plans are predominantly case study 
analysis (Preston et al., 2011; Poyar, 2010), or only assess collaboration and participation on the 
surface (Woodruf & Stults, 2016; Bierbaum et al, 2013). There is little understanding about the 
quality of collaboration such as the types of collaborative goals set, tools and mechanisms 
applied, stage of participant involvement, and power and access differences among stakeholders.  
It is pertinent to uncover these answers. My chapter addresses many of these questions 
through the development of an analysis framework, which I call Collaboration-in-Adaptation 
(CIA). My framework modifies the ‘Collaborative Governance Regimes’ framework, that is 
designed for application across broad policy areas. The CGR framework provides structural 
aspects of collaboration, but lacks a clear focus on agency and actors that participate in 
partnerships. To fill this gap I incorporate elements from public participation theory and inter-
organizational coordination from plan quality theories. The CIA framework is also specifically 




Way Forward: The results in this chapter are preliminary, and indicative of ways the 
CIA framework maybe applied to explore different research questions on collaboration. My 
results are limited due to the lack of inter-coder reliability, a requirement for vigorous content 
analysis and qualitative methodology of this kind. Never the less, efforts to create a robust 
framework on collaboration in adaptation is an important contribution to literature, on which my 
future research will be developed.  
Moving forward, I anticipate ‘collaborating’ with a team of researchers and applying my 
framework across all the 14 state adaptation plans. There are also benefits in exploring 
differences in collaborative pattern across plans across levels of government, and expanding the 
framework application to federal, tribal and local governments. Further, these studies can be 







The politics of climate adaptation is an understudied area in the field of political science 
(Javeline, 2014). Scientists have warned that even if global emissions are drastically reduced, 
given the accumulation of emissions already in the atmosphere, there will be adverse impacts 
from climate change (IPCC, 2015). With these projections, governments and communities will 
need to take some level of adaptation measures to prepare for the inevitable consequences of 
changing climates. Despite the gravity of the risks from climate change, comprehensive federal 
action on building resilience has been slow. Within this federal void, much like sub-national 
environmental policymaking in the United States, it is states and local governments who are 
taking the lead (Rabe, 2008).   
Growing adaptation commitment and initiatives by state and local governments demands 
a greater understanding of the sub-national politics surrounding the issue. In this dissertation, I 
explore three broad themes within the research agenda of sub-national climate adaptation – 
analysis of the predictors for the emergence of State Adaptation Plans (SAPs); understanding the 
urban politics around city level commitment to build resilience; and a deeper investigation into 
collaboration within adaptation planning. Each of these themes was presented in a separate 
chapter and I briefly present the main findings.  
Chapter-1 explores the state politics of adaptation. I apply the Diffusion of Innovation 
(DOI) theory on two dependent variables (DVs) – a dichotomous (yes/no) for policy adoption, 
and a more complex dependent variable that captures the ambitiousness of goals set within these 
SAPs. Using a more intricate DV allows for differencing between ‘shallow’ and ‘deep’ 




I find differences between predictors that influence policy adoption and policy 
ambitiousness. While state vulnerabilities and economic capacity matter in both cases, states are 
motivated to prepare ambitious SAPs when they face greater threats of climate impacts and 
pressures from environmental interest groups. On the other hand, citizen ideologies and previous 
mitigation policy experience are more influential in policy adoption. These findings shed light on 
the theoretical under-pinning’s of the DOI theory, and the need for policy analysis using more 
complex dependent variables. Dependent variables that capture more detailed dimensions of 
policy adoption have the potential to capture finer information on predictors of importance. 
I also explore conditional effects of state government ideologies and the severity of the 
problem, another concept not considered among adaptation studies. The results suggest that 
while as an independent predictor government ideology did not have a strong effect on SAPs, 
when examined from the conditional perspective, both conservative and liberal state institutions 
were likely to respond to increasing problem severity by adopting adaptation strategies. These 
finding are interesting and advance our understanding both theoretically and substantively.   
Chaper-2 examines urban politics and finds interesting patterns among commitment by 
local governments to build resilience and adapt to climate change. Applying the DOI theory to a 
relatively untested unit of analysis (cities), results suggest that neither state level characteristics 
and state policy experience, nor pressures from behavior of neighboring cities have a bearing on 
local policymakers. I also examine variations among city size, and shed light on an area not 
previously discussed in adaptation research. Interestingly, smaller cities respond differently to 
local factors than larger cities. Studies on sustainability policy have indicated that smaller cities 
lack the capacity and resources and have lagged behind in policy development (Portney, 2009). 




small cities, this outcome can be different. It is encouraging to see that the presence of 
environmental groups is a strong catalyst in policy development. 
Lastly, in Chapter-3, I delve deeper into the issue of climate adaptation and collaborative 
governance within State Adaptation Plans (SAPs). Prominent national and international 
frameworks on adaptation planning stress the need for collaboration among different levels of 
government and various stakeholders for successful adaptation. When examining collaboration 
literature, I find that previous studies examining adaptation plans either do not evaluate the plans 
for collaboration and participation (Preston et al., 2011; Poyar, 2010); or those that do mainly 
provide a list of stakeholders without a deeper analysis of these partnerships (Woodruf & Stults, 
2016; Bierbaum et al, 2013). There is little understanding about the quality of collaboration such 
as the types of collaborative goals set, tools and mechanisms applied, stage of participant 
involvement, and power and access differences among stakeholders. 
This chapter develops a framework to adequately respond to these multiple questions on 
collaboration, which I call Collaboration-in-Adaptation (CIA). I modify the Collaborative 
Governance Regime (CGR) Framework by Emerson & Nabatchi (2015) which is effective in 
providing the structural aspects of collaboration, but lacks a clear focus on agency and actors that 
participate in partnerships. To fill this gap I incorporate elements from public participation 
theory, and inter-organizational coordination from plan quality theories. The CIA framework is 
also specifically tailored to climate adaptation. This framework can be applied to various levels 
of governance and is an important contribution to evaluating the quality of adaptation plans. 
Broader Implications: The results from the dissertation are useful for policymakers, 
interest groups, non-governmental organizations, private sector and other agencies. Among state 




only when the severity of the problem is high. While on one hand it may seem positive that 
governments are responding to the intensity of the problem, in the context of climate change, this 
could be worrying. Studies also show that reactive adaptation (action after impacts occur) are 
more likely to result in exacerbating vulnerabilities, while anticipatory action (in preparation of 
exposure) reduce harmful impacts and facilitate recovery in the aftermath period (Adger et al., 
2005).  
Moreover, the carbon intensive industries, similar to climate mitigation, seem to exert 
strong opposing pressure for adaptation policies on both state and local governments. This 
oppositional force can be a hindrance for policy adoption, and governments could benefit from 
designing policy tools that provide financial and technical incentives to reduce the possible 
threats felt by this group of actors. For example, countries in Europe like Denmark, Sweden, 
France and Germany have developed innovative policy tools that create market incentives and 
support for carbon industries to switch to cleaner fuels and less polluting technologies (World 
Energy Council, 2016).  
In addition, state policies on adaptation are not likely to have a significant influence on 
local government policy making. This may mean that in order for us to see more proactive and 
comprehensive local planning, direct encouragement from higher government institutions could 
be necessary. Perhaps more explicit positive incentives such as grants and resource sharing or 
more negative carrot-and-stick approach with enforcement threats or penalties maybe required. 
Further, technical and financial support for better adaptation planning is suggested to help 
smaller cities prepare for resilience. Smaller cities usually lack resources, and given their 
vulnerabilities to climate change, greater backing by the federal and state governments could 




Way Forward: This dissertation is among the first large scale quantitative investigations 
of sub-national adaptation politics. While the results are interesting, these findings necessitate 
further investigation into this contemporary issue. First, there is a need for better indicators in the 
model to capture the severity of climate change. Existing measures capture human and property 
loss to current climate impacts, but do not incorporate anticipated or future effects. Measures that 
include both current and future projects of the negative consequences from climate change will 
be beneficial.  
There is also scope to expand my results from the cities chapter by developing better 
dependent variables to explore policy adoption and policy ambitiousness, as well as expand the 
study from a cross-sectional analysis to panel data spanning a longer period of time. Further, 
preliminary findings suggest interesting patterns among the interest group pressures and forms of 
government, and it would be useful to expand the investigation by testing conditional effects 
from factors. 
Moving ahead, my CIA framework can be applied to explore different research questions 
on collaboration. The structure proposed in this work has multiple dimensions of collaboration 
that can be delved into for deeper investigation. The framework can also be applied to 
understand collaborative patterns across plans developed by different levels of government like 
the federal, tribal and local governments. Further, these studies can be augmented with in-depth 
interviews and surveys with different stakeholders to triangulate findings. Climate adaptation is a 
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